

bulletin

NO. 1, 1947

1947

UNITED STATES PROTESTS SOVIET BLOCKADE

by HERBERT A. Goldhamer, Special Representative, Marshall to American Republics

25

GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION, AND TURKEY SINCE WORLD WAR II

Article by Harry E. Goldhamer

65





The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XIX, No. 472 • PUBLICATION 3218

July 18, 1948

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

SUBSCRIPTION:
52 issues, \$5; single copy, 15 cents

Published with the approval of the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION, AND TURKEY DURING WORLD WAR II

by Harry N. Howard

The Position of Turkey on the Eve of the War

During World War II the Turkish Republic, as was natural in view of its strategic position at the crossroads of three continents, was of great interest to both the Axis powers and the nations united during that struggle. Documentary evidence has thrown some light on Axis policy with respect to the Near East generally during the war period. This area was of considerable economic, political, and strategic significance.¹

It will be recalled that following World War I, which led to the partition of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey pursued a policy of friendship in good faith with the Soviet Union, based on the treaties of March 16, 1921, and December 17, 1925. It entered the League of Nations on July 18, 1932, and took a leading part, along with Greece, in the Balkan conferences (1930-1934) and the Balkan Entente (February 9, 1934). With Soviet support, Turkey succeeded in revising the Lausanne Straits convention (1923) at the Montreux conference of 1936, although its relations with the Soviet Union were somewhat complicated by Turkey's orientation toward Great Britain and France in the years between 1936 and 1939. Diplomatic relations with Germany and Italy remained in force, officially "correct" but not cordial, in the years immediately prior to the outbreak of the war in September 1939.

The Turkish press and Turks who were influential in public life did not look with favor upon the events which led to the Munich agreement of September 29-30, 1938, and the steady German diplomatic and economic advance into the Balkan region was viewed with cautious eye. The Italian invasion of Albania on April 7, 1939, caused considerable apprehension in Turkish official circles, despite the reassuring statements of Premier Mussolini. That the German Foreign Office was

not unaware of the possible influence of the Italian venture in Albania on Turkey was evident from the sending of Baron Franz von Papen to the post of Ambassador to Turkey, following his retirement after the *Anschluss* with Austria in April 1938, with the responsibility of keeping Turkey in line with German policy and also of keeping Turkey neutral, at least, in the event of another great war.

Events moved very rapidly in southeastern Europe in the spring of 1939, following the German march into Praha and the destruction of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, where the diplomatic missions of Germany, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union were all very active. As early as February 1939 the Soviet Union had proposed a Black Sea pact to protect its southern approaches. Moreover, on April 13, 1939, Prime Minister Chamberlain, following the offer of a guaranty to Poland, announced in the House of Commons that Great Britain attached the greatest importance "to the avoidance of disturbance by force or threat of force of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula", offered support to Greece and Rumania, in case their independence were threatened, and communicated this declaration to Turkey. The French Government made a similar declaration.²

Although Rumania had refused to participate in the "encirclement" of Germany, it was still an open question whether Turkey would become involved in this policy. Von Ribbentrop told Von Papen in mid-April 1939 that if the "encirclement" ring were closed, this time with the participation of Turkey in contrast to 1914, there would be no alternative to war. Von Papen arrived in Turkey on April 29, 1939, the very day that M. Potemkin, the Soviet Vice-Commissar for

NOTE: See footnotes on p. 76.

Foreign Affairs, had arrived in Ankara for important conversations, and both were received by President İnönü on this date. While Potemkin impressed on Turkey the desirability of resistance to possible German aggression and the importance of strengthening relations among the Balkan States, especially with Great Britain and France, Von Papen recalled the old Turco-German friendship and insisted that there were no reasons for strained relations between Germany and Turkey and no reason for Turkish fears.

Turkey, apparently, was not unreceptive to the British announcement of April 13, although the British appeared to desire an agreement to protect the entire Mediterranean while Turkey desired to bind itself only in the eastern Mediterranean. On May 12, 1939, pending conclusion of a definitive instrument, Great Britain and Turkey signed a provisional agreement, declaring their joint concern for the security of the Balkan region and pledging their cooperation in the event of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean.³ At the same time France and Turkey were reaching agreement concerning the Hatay (Alexandretta) region—an agreement ultimately signed on June 23, 1939.

Meanwhile, Von Papen came to Berlin for the signature of the German-Italian alliance of May 22, 1939, using the occasion to advise Count Ciano of Turkish fears concerning Italian policy as to Albania, and proposing that Italy return the Dodecanese Islands to Turkey and pointing out the important strategic position of Turkey in Germany's calculations.⁴ On his return to Ankara the German Ambassador continued to warn Berlin concerning the possibilities of encirclement, indicating that Great Britain had asked Turkey to agree to make it possible for the British to render active assistance to any state guaranteed by it, in case it should come to a showdown. The Germans interpreted this to mean that Turkey, even if not directly attacked, would permit passage of British warships through the Straits to assist the Soviet Union.⁵

The German-Soviet Pact of Nonaggression and the Problem of Turkey

The position of Turkey was discussed considerably in the weeks immediately preceding the signing of the Soviet-German pact of nonaggression on August 23, 1939. At the conference between

Hitler and Ciano at Obersalzberg on August 13, 1939, for example, when the Balkan problem was surveyed, it was recognized that the Axis could count on Bulgaria only as reliable and that the Dodecanese Islands might be placed in a difficult position because of the Turkish attitude.⁶ Moreover, in a conversation between Admiral Canaris of German Naval Intelligence and General Keitel on August 17,⁷ Canaris called attention to the actions of the British in the Balkans and tried to explain that "the English would certainly have everything prepared in the Balkans" for eventualities. Bulgaria would not prove useful "as an ally as it would be attacked at once by Rumania and Turkey". But such a development did not alarm the Führer, who, in a secret talk to the Supreme Commander and Commanding Generals on August 22, 1939, at Obersalzberg, stated that he had "decided to go with Stalin", remarking that there were only three "great statesmen in the world: Stalin, myself, and Mussolini". Turkey, in the Führer's mind, was "ruled by morons and half-idiots" following Atatürk's death and need cause no worry.⁸

On August 23, 1939, the Soviet-German non-aggression agreement was signed in Moscow.⁹ As a prelude to formal negotiation of the agreement, Stalin was informed that Germany would be prepared to recognize the primary Soviet interests in the region from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and the Germans continually repeated that, despite certain ideological differences, there was no reason for basic conflict of interest. In the delimitation of spheres in southeastern Europe, Bessarabia was assigned to the Soviet Union, and Germany indicated a political distinterestedness, despite economic interests in southeastern Europe, "even, if necessary, as far as Constantinople and the Straits."¹⁰ Although Von Ribbentrop indicated that the problem of Turkey had not been discussed, in fact, it was discussed with Stalin and Molotov on the night of August 23-24,¹¹ Stalin himself asking Ribbentrop what Germany thought about Turkey. The German Foreign Minister indicated that he had done everything to promote more friendly relations with Turkey but that Turkey had become "one of the first countries to join the encirclement pact against Germany and had not even considered it necessary to notify the Reich Government of the Pact". Both Stalin and Molotov observed that the Soviet Union had

had "a similar experience with the vacillating policy of the Turks".

Von Papen deemed it his primary duty to keep Turkey from going into the war on the side of Great Britain and to preserve the economic ties between Turkey and Germany, especially in view of the importance of Turkish chrome for Germany.

Official Turkey was lukewarm in its attitude and policy toward Germany, and there is no doubt that the Turkish Government was somewhat shocked at the seeming shift in the position of the Soviet Union in the signing of the pact of August 23, 1939.

The Turkish Negotiations With the Soviet Union, September-October 1939: The Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty

As a result of the signature of the Soviet-German treaty of August 23 both Mussolini and Hitler envisaged that Turkey would be forced to alter its position. Thus, on August 25, 1939,¹² Hitler wrote Mussolini that Turkey would have to revise its "previous position", and Mussolini replied on the same day that the treaty blockaded both Rumania and Turkey and that "a new attitude on the part of Turkey would upset all the strategic plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean".

The Turkish Foreign Minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, was in Moscow from September 25 to October 17, 1939, for the purpose of signing a pact with the Soviet Government with provisions concerning the Straits, the essence of which had been discussed between Ambassador Terentiev and Saraçoğlu in Ankara.¹³ But Saraçoğlu ran into difficulties in Moscow, for the Soviet position appeared to have altered considerably. Ribbentrop was again in Moscow on September 28 to sign a new agreement on the delimitation of German-Soviet spheres in eastern Europe, and the Turkish Foreign Minister was kept waiting for three weeks.¹⁴

As a matter of fact, the German Foreign Office was much interested in the Soviet-Turkish negotiations, and as early as September 2, Count von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reported that Molotov had confirmed rumors from Istanbul that Turkey was already negotiating with the Soviet Union.¹⁵ After consulting with Stalin, Molotov told Schulenburg that there was only a non-

aggression pact with Turkey and relations were "good in general." Moscow was prepared to work for permanent neutrality of Turkey, as desired by Germany, and the German conception of the Turkish position in the conflict which had broken out on September 1 was shared in Moscow. No use of Molotov's remarks, however, was to be made in dealing with the Turks. On September 5¹⁶ Schulenburg asked Molotov to continue working on Turkey "with a view to permanent neutrality", mentioning rumors that Great Britain was putting pressure on Rumania to take an active part and was holding out a prospect of aid from British and French troops. Since such assistance might come by sea, "it was in the interests of the Soviet Government to prevail upon Turkey to close the Dardanelles completely". Molotov thought the Soviet Union had "considerable influence" with Turkey and was exerting it in this sense, adding that the conversations on a mutual-assistance pact had borne no fruit. Moreover, Stalin told Schulenburg on September 17¹⁷ that Turkey had proposed an assistance pact which was to apply to the Straits and the Balkans but would obligate Turkey to assist the Soviet Union only in "such actions as are not directed against England and France". The Soviet Government was not "greatly edified" by this suggestion and was considering a clause whereby the Soviet Government would not be obligated to any action against Germany. Voroshilov, who was present, thought such a pact would be a "hook" by which Turkey could be pulled away from France". On October 2¹⁸ Schulenburg was instructed to inform Molotov of the German belief that Turkey would hesitate as to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish pact if the Soviet Union "emphatically" opposed it, and it was important in the Soviet interest, because of the question of the Straits, "to forestall a tie-up of Turkey with England and France". Ribbentrop was therefore especially anxious that the Soviet Government dissuade Turkey "from the final conclusion of mutual assistance pacts with the Western powers and to settle this at once with Moscow". Probably the best solution would be the return of Turkey to a policy of absolute neutrality, while confirming existing Soviet-Turkish agreements. Prompt and final diversion of Turkey from the Anglo-French treaty, Von Ribbentrop felt, would also be "in keeping with the peace offensive agreed upon in Moscow" on September 28, since another country

"would withdraw from the Anglo-French camp." Von Papen had similar instructions on October 2¹⁹ and was to advise the Turks of the strong Soviet aversion toward a pact with Great Britain and France. Molotov appeared to share the German view of the situation, although it appeared to him that Turkey had already become closely involved with France and Great Britain. When Schulenburg told him on October 3 of rumors that Great Britain and France intended to assault Greece and overrun Bulgaria in order to establish a Balkan front, Molotov "asserted spontaneously that the Soviet Government would never tolerate pressure on Bulgaria".²⁰ Schulenburg kept plying Molotov with advice, and on October 7 was instructed to find out in detail concerning the Soviet-Turkish negotiations, particularly with regard to the Straits.²¹ Meanwhile, Molotov had not seen Saraçoglu since October 1 and by October 9 thought a mutual-assistance pact would not be concluded, although German interests and the special nature of Soviet-German relations would be upheld, since the Soviet Government was trying to induce Turkey "to adopt full neutrality and to close the Dardanelles as well as to aid in maintaining peace in the Balkans".

There is no doubt that the Turkish Government was somewhat alarmed at the expansionist attitude shown by the Soviet Union in the direction of the Baltic States during the fall of 1939. Moreover, the treatment accorded Saraçoglu was not appreciated. In addition, the Turkish Government was not willing to accept the conditions on which the Soviet Government had insisted.

The negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were broken off, therefore, on October 17, and two days later, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty of mutual assistance, October 19, 1939, was signed.²² The treaty pledged mutual assistance on the part of the three signatories, "in the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean". Despite the implications as to the Straits, protocol no. 2 declared specifically that Turkey's obligations could not "compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union".

Mr. Molotov gave his own interpretation of the Soviet-Turkish negotiations in a report to the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on October 31, 1939,²³ in

which Great Britain and France were accused of prolonging the war, acknowledgment was made that Soviet relations with Germany had "radically improved" and were based "on a firm foundation of mutual interests", and the Soviet actions with respect to the Baltic States were explained. There had been all sorts of rumors as to the Turkish negotiations, but Mr. Molotov denied that the Soviet Union had demanded the cession of Kars and Ardahan from Turkey. He also denied that the Soviet Union had "demanded changes in the international convention concluded at Montreux and a privileged position as regards the Dardanelles". This was "also a fabrication and a lie", for all the Soviet Union had desired, he said, was the conclusion of a "bilateral pact of mutual assistance limited to the regions of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles". Such a pact could not involve armed conflict with Germany, and the Soviet Union "should have a guarantee that, in view of the war danger, Turkey would not allow warships of non-Black Sea powers to pass through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea. Turkey rejected both these stipulations of the U.S.S.R. and thereby made the conclusion of the pact impossible." Although no pact had resulted, a number of political questions had been cleared up, including Turkey's foreign policy. The Turkish Government, according to Molotov, had preferred to tie its fate up with Great Britain and France, who were waging war on Germany, and, while this might be pleasing to France and Great Britain, Molotov wondered "whether Turkey will not come to regret this—we shall not try to guess". In any case, this was not Soviet foreign policy, thanks to which the Soviet Union had secured "not a few successes in the sphere of foreign affairs". He was convinced that the policy of peace held out the best prospect for the future and indicated that it would be pursued "in the region of the Black Sea, too, confident that we shall fully ensure its proper application as demanded by the interests of the Soviet Union and of the states friendly to the Soviet Union".

Soviet-German Relations and the Turkish Problem, June-November 1940

Relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union cooled perceptibly after October 1939, while relations between Germany and the Soviet Union ap-

peared more close, although the partners in "non-aggression" by no means fully trusted each other, especially because of Germany's diplomatic and military moves in the Balkans, notably in the case of Hungary and Rumania. The Soviet Government forced Rumania to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina on June 28, 1940, and on August 30, 1940, through the Vienna award, Rumania lost one half of Transylvania. At the same time Germany gave a guaranty to Rumania, and German troops soon poured into that country for the alleged purposes of military instruction and protection of the oil fields. Moreover, the Soviet Government was also somewhat concerned when Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940.²⁴ Finally, the two powers were completely at odds over the control of the Danube River.

It was not difficult, in the view of events, for Von Papen to keep Turkey from entering the war during the early part of the struggle, nor did the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty call for action. On the occasion of Italy's entry into the war, June 11, 1940, Turkey continued to maintain her neutrality. On July 18 Turkey signed a commercial agreement with Germany, which did not, however, provide for the shipment of chrome to Germany.

Throughout the period the question of Turkey continued to be discussed between Germany and the Soviet Union, the later regarding Turkey "with deep suspicion", as a result of Turkey's attitude toward the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany, and this attitude was intensified by the Turkish policy "in regard to the Black Sea, where Turkey desired to play the dominant role, and the Straits, where Turkey wanted to exercise exclusive jurisdiction", as Molotov told the Italian Ambassador on June 25, 1940. The Soviet Union was apparently willing to recognize Italy's "hegemony" in the Mediterranean provided the latter recognized the Soviet position in Black Sea. By July Soviet interest was focused on events in the Baltic and on developments in relation to Turkey and Iran, but the Soviet Union was not too fearful of German military victories on the Continent. In mid-July Stalin was quoted as having remarked to Sir Stafford Cripps that, although interested in the Balkan region, "no power had the right to an exclusive role in the consolidation and leadership of the Balkan countries", and the Soviet Union did not assert such a mission. As to Tur-

key, he repeated that the Soviet Union was "in fact opposed to the exclusive jurisdiction of Turkey over the Straits and to Turkey's dictation of conditions in the Black Sea. The Turkish Government was aware of that."²⁵

By the fall of 1940, Berlin was ready to explore German-Soviet relations further, and on October 13²⁶ Ribbentrop wrote to Stalin suggesting that Molotov visit Berlin for talks. Stalin replied on October 21,²⁷ agreeing that a further improvement in Soviet-German relations was "entirely possible on the permanent basis of a long-range delimitation of mutual interests". Meanwhile, on November 1, President İnönü reaffirmed Turkey's non-belligerency and friendship with both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Together with Great Britain, Turkey was studying and trying to envisage the results of the situation, and he hoped that these principles would help to maintain Turkish security in the future and declared that Soviet-Turkish friendship was of intrinsic value.

Molotov arrived in Berlin on November 12 and during the next 48 hours he had conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler covering the entire gamut of Soviet-German relations, including such problems as the Skaggerak and Kategat, the Baltic Sea, Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, southeastern Europe, Turkey, the Straits, Iran, and Sakhalin. Ribbentrop told Molotov on November 12²⁸ of the Führer's conviction that it would be advantageous to establish spheres of influence among Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan, since the expansion of all was toward the south and there should be no real conflict, and reminded him of "the good business" which had been done since August 1939. Ribbentrop thought that the easiest access to the sea for the Soviet Union lay through the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Turning to Turkey, Ribbentrop, who believed the end of the war near, inquired of Soviet interest there. He thought Turkey should be induced to free itself from British ties and believed adoption of "a common platform" by Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan would help in this direction. The Turks knew of the German position, and Ribbentrop expressed his understanding of the Soviet dissatisfaction with the Montreux Convention of the Straits, Germany being "even more dissatisfied". The Soviet Union, in Ribbentrop's view, should have certain privileges in the Black Sea, and Soviet warships and merchant vessels

should have freer access to the Mediterranean. Mussolini was also sympathetic to this view, and it seemed advisable that Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union adopt a common policy toward Turkey, bringing that country into line with the Axis, writing a new Straits convention, and considering the problem of whether it might not be possible to "recognize the territorial integrity of Turkey".

In a talk with Hitler on November 12²⁹ Molotov was reminded that the historic moment had come, that the British Empire would be liquidated after the war, already won, and that the Soviet Union and Germany should reach a basic agreement—a point of view with which Molotov was in accord. The problem of Soviet access to the sea was stressed, and Hitler repeated that Germany was prepared at any time to effect "an improvement for Russia in the regime of the Straits". Molotov, however, wanted some specific answers to questions, particularly about Soviet interests in the Balkans and the Black Sea, and about the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. The next day there were more detailed discussions with the Führer,³⁰ Molotov asserting Finland's position in the Soviet sphere, protesting against the German guaranty to Rumania, and raising the question of a Soviet guaranty of Bulgaria, which was in the zone of the Straits, remarking that the Straits were "England's historic gateway for attack on the Soviet Union". Hitler was evasive on these points but thought the decisive point was whether the Soviet Union saw an opportunity "to gain sufficient security for her Black Sea interests through a revision of the Montreux Convention". Although an immediate reply was not expected, Molotov stated that the Soviet Union only wanted to be secure from attack via the Straits and would like to settle the matter with Turkey, and that a guarantee to Bulgaria would alleviate the situation. Hitler agreed as to the freer passage of Soviet warships through the Straits, to the exclusion of nonriverain warships, but Molotov wanted something more than a "paper" guarantee. Returning to the Bulgarian problem, Molotov indicated that the Soviet Union was "prepared to guarantee Bulgaria an outlet on the Aegean Sea". In the end, Hitler felt that the question of the Straits would have to be studied further.

After dinner at the Soviet Embassy on the evening of November 13³¹ Molotov and Ribbentrop

continued their talks in the latter's air-raid shelter. Ribbentrop believed that the real problem was general collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Axis, indicating that then an understanding with Turkey could be reached, since Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union were particularly interested in the Straits question. Even though it was clear that the discussions would take some time, in order to facilitate matters, Ribbentrop had had a draft agreement³² prepared which he submitted to Molotov for his consideration, as the discussions were continued through the diplomatic channel. In the draft the four states were to collaborate against extension of the war, for an early conclusion of the peace, and mutually to respect their spheres of influence. In the delimitation of spheres of interest, German territorial aspirations were defined in Central Africa; Italian, in Northern and Northeastern Africa; Japanese, in Eastern Asia; and Soviet aspirations in the direction of the Indian Ocean. But in a secret protocol no. 2 Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union were to detach Turkey from its commitments to Great Britain and gradually to win Turkey over to political collaboration with the Axis, signing, at the same time, an agreement recognizing the extent of Turkey's possessions. Finally there was to be a new Straits convention granting the Soviet Union unrestricted right of naval passage through the Straits, while all other powers, with the exception of other Black Sea powers, would renounce the right of passage for naval vessels. Commercial passage, of course, would remain free.³³

Thus ended the discussions in Berlin, and it is worthy of passing notice that on November 12 the Führer, as a precautionary move, ordered that "all preparations" for possible difficulties in the East were to continue.³³ Curiously enough, too, the files of the High Command of the German Navy³⁴ contain some interesting notes with respect to the Hitler-Molotov conversations; an entry of November 16, 1940, indicates that Molotov not only requested bases in the Turkish Straits but also demanded the Kars-Ardahan region of Turkey.

By November 25, 1940, Molotov was ready to comment definitively on the draft agreement which Ribbentrop had presented to him on November 13.³⁵ He asked Schulenburg to call on him and, in the presence of Dekanosov, the Soviet Am-

bassador to Berlin, told Schulenburg that, subject to some conditions, the Soviet Government was ready to accept the draft of the Four Power Pact outlined in Berlin. As a price, German troops would have to be withdrawn immediately from Finland, although German economic interests would be protected. Secondly, within the next few months, the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits would have to be protected "by the conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria" which geographically was situated within "the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease".³⁶ It was also stipulated that the "area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf" be recognized "as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union" and that Japan renounce its rights to concessions for coal and oil in northern Sakhalin. Therefore, in Molotov's view, the draft of the protocol on spheres of influence would have to be amended in order to stipulate "the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf".³⁷ But it is also of special interest to note that Molotov proposed amending the draft protocol between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union—

"so as to guarantee a base for light naval and land forces of the U.S.S.R. on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease, including—in case Turkey declares herself willing to join the Four Power Pact—a guarantee of the independence and of the territory of Turkey by the three countries named.

"This protocol should provide that in case Turkey refuses to join the Four Powers, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree to work out and to carry through the required military and diplomatic measures, and a separate agreement to this effect should be concluded."

In addition to protocols concerning Finland and Sakhalin, Molotov also proposed a protocol which should recognize that Bulgaria was within "the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union" and therefore it was a political necessity that a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual-assist-

ance treaty should be signed. Molotov now desired a statement of the German view as to the Soviet counter-proposal for Soviet cooperation with the Axis.

The Turco-German Nonaggression Pact and the German Attack on the Soviet Union

The aftermath of the November 1940 conversations, especially in southeastern Europe, Turkey, and the Near East was interesting. On November 25, the very day on which Molotov had stated the Soviet terms to Schulenburg, Moscow made 12 proposals to Bulgaria, recalling that it was "vitally interested in the Straits for the sake of the security of the Black Sea frontier" and could not "permit a repetition of the danger" which was "constantly directed through the Straits toward southern Russia". A mutual-assistance pact was therefore proposed which would assist Bulgaria in realizing its national aspirations both in Western (Greek) and in Eastern (Turkish) Thrace and under which Bulgaria would assist the Soviet Union in case of a threat to Soviet interests in the Black Sea or in the Straits. If Turkey threatened or attacked Bulgaria, the latter would have Soviet assistance and support in the achievement of Bulgarian claims to "the European part of Turkey". Moreover the Soviet Union would withdraw objections to Bulgaria's signature of the Tripartite Pact, and it was "entirely possible that the Soviet Union" would "in this case adhere to the Three Power Pact". The Bulgarians informed the Germans of this move, felt that signature of a mutual-assistance treaty would be regarded as unfriendly in Turkey, and indicated no direct interest in the Straits.

On December 18, 1940,³⁸ the Führer ordered that the German armed forces be prepared "to crush Russia in a quick campaign even before the conclusion of the war with England", and early in 1941 there were increasing preparations for action in southeastern Europe, although Berlin was advised that Moscow would take "the strongest interest" in such movements and would want to know, especially, how Bulgaria and the Straits might be affected. There was considerable Soviet fear that Great Britain, as a countermove, might occupy both Bulgaria and the region of the Straits.

While Germany was getting ready to move into

the Balkans with force and to explain the move on the ground that it was necessary to block the British in Greece, Turkey signed a nonaggression pact with Bulgaria on February 17. Upon the German occupation of Bulgaria, on March 1, Molotov drafted a note in Schulenburg's presence expressing "regret" that Germany, by moving into Bulgaria, had done injury "to the security interests of the U.S.S.R.", maintaining its basic position as stated in the memorandum of November 25.³⁹ At the same time Hitler advised President İnönü that the move into Bulgaria would not affect Turkish interests. Meanwhile, the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, was in the Near East toward the end of February 1941 attempting to reconstitute a Balkan pact, composed of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, but failed because of Yugoslav and Turkish reluctance, although the Anglo-Turkish pact was reaffirmed on February 28. The German view of the general situation and of relations between the Soviet Union and Germany was well revealed in the Matsuoka conversations in Berlin on March 27, 28, and 29 and April 4, when the Japanese Foreign Minister was told that the Soviet conditions for cooperation were not acceptable, involving, as they did, sacrifice of German interests in Finland, the granting of bases on the Straits, and a strong influence in the Balkans, especially in Bulgaria.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, as a possible counterweight to the German moves, a Soviet-Turkish agreement, reaffirming the pact of December 19, 1925, with an additional declaration covering aggression against either on the part of a third power, was signed on March 24, 1941. The next day the Svetkovich Government in Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, but was overthrown by a *coup d'état* on March 27, and the Germans concluded that Yugoslavia must be crushed immediately.⁴¹ A few hours before the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece on April 6, 1941, the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Yugoslavia, a move which the Germans considered "unfortunate".⁴² But there was no indication that the Soviet Government did not want to remain friendly with Germany.

By this time Hitler was considering an attack on the Soviet Union. June 22, 1941, was set as the date as early as April 30, 1941.⁴³ But he was also moving in the direction of a nonaggression pact with Turkey and toward a larger develop-

ment in the Near East as a whole, since Yugoslavia was crushed by April 17 and the Greek High Command had surrendered on April 23.⁴⁴ Revolt had broken out in Iraq on May 2, 1941, and Mussolini and Ribbentrop discussed this development in relation to Turkey in a conference in Rome on May 13.⁴⁵ It was agreed that help should be extended to Iraq and Von Papen was instructed "to obtain from the Turks permission for the secret passage of arms for Iraq through Turkish territory", in which case it might also be possible to send large airborne forces into Iraq for operations against the British, and even Egypt might be attacked. Il Duce thought Turkey was the Axis "trump card" and wondered whether it would march with Germany and Italy. Ribbentrop indicated that Germany was using its influence in this direction, with some prospect of success, since Turkey would not like to see large British forces in Iraq.

Germany, therefore, pushed the matter of an agreement with Turkey in May and June 1941, meeting, however, with a number of difficulties, especially in view of the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1939 and of the Turkish desire not to be drawn into the conflict.⁴⁶ Von Papen, at one point, however, took it for granted that transit of war materials to Iraq could be considered as guaranteed. But that position had to be dropped, and on June 9⁴⁷ Ribbentrop summed up the Turkish position by remarking:

"Turkey desires to conclude a treaty with Germany to assure itself against a German attack; however, simultaneously, it is desirous of maintaining the alliance with England, and visibly, to assure herself, on the side, of the possibility of collaborating with her politically and militarily. The Turkish Government must absolutely understand that if it collaborates, even on the side, with England, against whom Germany is involved in a death struggle, by this fact, it ranges Turkey on the side of Germany's enemies. Turkey would thereby abandon anew the neutrality, the reestablishment of which must be considered as the least of the results of its treaty with Germany. We are evidently in agreement as to the fact that Turkey desires that the treaty with Germany be drafted in such a manner that it does not appear as an open rupture of her treaty with England; our proposals have been drafted in this sense. If, how-

ever, Turkey demands of us the positive recognition of her treaty with England and if she wishes to reserve especially the possibility of collaborating with the latter, this would evidently be unacceptable for us."

In the end Germany obtained no more than the nonaggression treaty of June 18, 1941, without secret commitments or wider implications, which clearly reaffirmed Turkey's prior obligations under the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty of October 19, 1939. Four days later, on June 22, the German armies were hurled against the Soviet Union as Hitler had already decided on April 30. It is noteworthy that Molotov indicated his inability to understand German dissatisfaction with Soviet policy, while the Germans recited their own charges against Soviet policy with respect to the Balkans and Turkey as among the reasons for open hostilities.⁴⁸ In Hitler's proclamation of June 22, 1941, he repeated the German version of the Molotov conversations of November 1940 for propaganda purposes, and the charges were soon denied in Moscow.

German Pressure on Turkey

With the German attack on the Soviet Union the position of Turkey took on new significance. Although Von Papen asserted that Turkey should not be used as a route to the Suez Canal and thought there were no actual military plans involving Turkey, this situation might change if Marshal Rommel finally reached the Suez Canal and the German armies in the east attained the Persian Gulf via the Caucasus, in which case Turkey would be surrounded and would lose much of its strategic value to Germany.⁴⁹ The Germans, of course, soon told the Turks about the Soviet-German conversations, but on August 10, 1941, Great Britain and the Soviet Union confirmed their fidelity to the Montreux convention and assured the Turkish Government that they had no aggressive intentions or claims with regard to the Straits. Both Governments were prepared scrupulously to respect the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic, and, in the event of an attack by a European power, they were ready to give Turkey every help and assistance. The Germans also sought to stimulate Turkish official interest in the Pan-Turanian movement with a view to territorial aggrandizement, but without success in view of the nationalistic legacy of Atatürk.⁵⁰

On October 9, 1941, as foreshadowed in the June 18 treaty, a German-Turkish economic agreement was signed after desperate German efforts to secure Turkish chrome, but it was not to be valid before March 31, 1943, for an exchange of goods to the value of about £T100,000,000. Germany was to provide steel and war materials in exchange for Turkish raw materials. Turkey was to supply Germany with 90,000 tons of chrome in each of the years 1943 and 1944, but only after Germany had delivered to Turkey war materials to the value of £T18,000,000, and after the expiry of the Anglo-Turkish agreement concerning chrome. The United States—four days prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor—declared the defense of Turkey essential to the defense of the United States and extended lend-lease assistance to Turkey on December 3, 1941.

During the period immediately prior to and just after the entry of the United States into the war, there was considerable German discussion as to the position of Turkey. The Germans knew that Turkey desired to avoid open hostilities but pointed out that while Great Britain could offer nothing to Turkey, Germany held in her hands "the Greek islands at the entrance of the Dardanelles", which were of vital importance to Turkey. In the event of success against the Soviet Union, Turkey must become "more and more friendly", although since the period of Atatürk, Turkey had been pursuing a policy of national consolidation and domestic reconstruction and had expressed "no desire at all to obtain any territorial gain". Nevertheless, it might be induced to "enlarge its benevolent neutrality and to facilitate access to the Arab territories and the Suez Canal for the German High Command".⁵¹ Von Papen, however, reported on January 5, 1942,⁵² that the American entry into the war had produced a "sentiment of profound deception" in Turkey, which would reiterate its desire to avoid hostilities, and he did not believe that Turkey should be pushed too far, lest Turkey enter the war on the other side, although there were fears regarding the Soviet Union, particularly on the part of Numan Menemencioglu.

Turkish policy continued to develop in this manner during the spring and summer of 1942, and Near Eastern questions, particularly that of Turkey, figured largely in the Hitler-Mussolini conversation at Salzburg on April 29, 1942,⁵³ when

1 MUSSOLINI

Hitler assured Il Duce that "Turkey was moving slowly but surely over to the Axis" in view of the suspicion of the Russians. There was also the problem of an Axis declaration concerning the independence of India and the Arab countries. Hitler and Molotov agreed that this matter could wait, however, and Hitler took the position that such a declaration would only be a practical matter "when the Axis troops stood south of the Caucasus". German pressure on the Turks continued in the summer, the Germans insisting on the "unrealistic" character of Turkish policy, conjuring the Soviet demands on the Straits before the Turks, and holding out the Pan-Turanian dream, only to meet the view that the preservation of the "absolute neutrality" of Turkey was indispensable. However, a new trade agreement was signed on June 2, 1942, and it was announced on September 29 that Turkey had contracted to send 45,000 tons of chrome, about one half the annual production, to the Krupp works in exchange for arms.⁵⁴

Turkey, the United States, and Great Britain

Following the Casablanca meeting of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on January 14, 1943, and clearing of North Africa, there were possibilities that Turkey might be involved, with resulting German pressure or invasion of the country. Mr. Churchill, therefore, telegraphed President İnönü on January 26, and the two met at Adana on January 30, after which Churchill declared the British wish to see Turkish territories, rights, and interests effectively preserved, and the British desire to have "warm and friendly relations" between Turkey and the Soviet Union.⁵⁵

Following the Quebec (August 11-24), Moscow (October 19-30), and Tehran (November 28-December 1) conferences, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill conferred with President İnönü and Foreign Minister Menemencioglu at Cairo on December 4-6, 1943. Indeed, it had been agreed at the Tehran conference on December 1, 1943, that, from the military point of view, "it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year".⁵⁶ Moreover, note was taken of Marshal Stalin's statement that "if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her", the Soviet Union "would immediately be at war with Bul-

garia".⁵⁷ The conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war. A communiqué was issued after the Cairo conference which declared that İnönü, Roosevelt, and Churchill had examined the general situation, taken into account the "joint and several interests of the three countries", and indicated that "the closest unity existed between the United States of America, Turkey and Great Britain in their attitude to the world situation". It was also stated that the identity of interests and views of the United States and Great Britain with those of the Soviet Union and the traditional friendship between the three powers and Turkey had been reaffirmed throughout the proceedings at the Cairo conference.

The subject of the Cairo conversations had been Turkey's possible entry into the war, and Numan Menemencioglu later indicated that the talks had been carried on with "almost brutal" frankness but that the Anglo-Turkish ties had been strengthened. As a result, Anglo-Turkish military discussions were carried on in January and February but were broken off on February 3, 1944. Nevertheless, events now moved ineluctably toward a break with Germany, first economically and then diplomatically. By April 20, 1944, Turkey was induced to stop the shipments of chrome to Germany, effective the next day, although on May 24, 1944, Mr. Churchill, in a statement to the House of Commons⁵⁸ spoke "bluntly", indicating that no pressure had been brought to bear on Turkey and stating that Turkey would not have the strong position at the peace conference which would attend entry into the struggle. He noted the suspension of chrome shipments, however, looked toward entire suspension of economic relations with Germany, and expressed confidence that a still better day would dawn for Anglo-Turkish relations, and indeed, "with all the great Allies". In June there were difficulties with respect to the passage of certain German ships through the Straits, and Mr. Eden expressed his disturbance in the House of Commons concerning the matter on June 14. On June 15, 1944, Numan Menemencioglu resigned as Foreign Minister.⁵⁹

On August 2, 1944, Turkey broke off diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. Although the Soviet Government was reserved in its attitude toward the Turkish action, Prime Minister

Churchill announced in the House of Commons that he could not forget that "Turkey declared her alliance with us before the present war, when our armaments were weak and our policy pacific". The Turkish action had infused "new life into the alliance" between Turkey and Great Britain. If Turkey were attacked by Germany or Bulgaria, Great Britain would, of course, make common cause. The British Prime Minister also hoped that the break with Germany would "contribute to the continuity of friendship of Turkey and Russia". Two days later Von Papen and his staff of the German Embassy in Ankara departed for Germany.

In the months which followed, the United States and Great Britain opened conversations with the Turkish Government concerning the right of merchant vessels to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea; the United States, however, assumed that there was no need for special agreement in view of the provisions of the Montreux convention. By the middle of January 1945 supplies to the Soviet Union were passing through the Turkish Straits. On February 23, 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan and the next

day announced its intention to adhere to the Declaration by United Nations, and the adherence of Turkey was, in fact, signed on February 28, 1945.⁶⁰

The policy and position of Turkey, at the crossroads of three continents, situated at the Straits and occupying a strategic key to the entire Near and Middle East, were naturally of concern both to the Axis and to the Allies during the entire period of World War II. It was also natural that the Turkish Government should have adopted a cautious policy throughout this period. The evidence indicates that Turkey was faithful as a nonbelligerent to its obligations under the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1939 and that its position as a neutral served the interests of the Allies. Had it acted prematurely the entire Near East might well have been thrown open to the Axis armed forces in the critical period of 1940-1942. In the end, it did not become involved in actual armed conflict largely because there was no concerted or integrated plan for Turkish operations, no Balkan campaign was carried out on a scale to involve Turkish forces, and no supplies were diverted by the western powers for this purpose.

Statistics Concerning Shipping in the Turkish Straits

TABLE I

Registered Net Tonnage (1913-1923)¹

Flag	1913 ²	1920 ³	1921	1922	1923
American		266, 679	300, 277	589, 778	222, 481
Austro-Hungarian	1, 615, 293				
Belgian	295, 038				
British	5, 370, 781	557, 353	204, 065	1, 488, 171	1, 994, 689
Dutch	199, 034	46, 419	121, 488	210, 754	380, 817
French	572, 730	231, 318	500, 062	644, 073	632, 087
German	733, 600		38, 508	38, 311	167, 651
Greek	1, 958, 201	331, 203	559, 338	614, 804	276, 283
Italian	370, 302	329, 491	385, 684	759, 062	1, 513, 180
Norwegian	288, 203				
Rumanian	350, 302	138, 537	172, 885	284, 925	457, 564
Russian	1, 428, 435	256, 375	64, 371	31, 042	68, 498
Turkish	906, 416	77, 331	18, 453	29, 668	296, 322
Other		238, 109	360, 277	473, 162	490, 606
Total	13, 412, 065	2, 472, 815	2, 725, 408	5, 164, 650	6, 500, 178

¹ These statistical data have been gathered from the following sources: (1) *Rapport de la Commission des Détroits à la Société des Nations* (1924-1935); (2) *République turque. Ministère des Affaires étrangères. Rapport Annuel sur le Mouvement des Navires à Travers les Détroits et des Aéronefs Civils entre la Méditerranée et la Mer Noire* (1936-1941); (3) *T. C. Istanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi Mecmuasi* (*Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie d'Istanbul* (1941); (4) *Basvekalet Istatistik. Umum Mudurlugu* (Republique turque. Présidence du Conseil. Office central de statistique). *Istatistik Yilligi* (*Annuaire Statistique*), vol. 12, no. 194. 1940-1941 Ankara, 1941).

² From Phillipson and Buxton, *The Question of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus*, pp. 232-233. In 1911 the number of vessels passing the Bosphorus was 34,562, with a total tonnage of 19,968,409; in 1912 there were 34,577, with a total tonnage of 15,298,537; and in 1913 there were 34,826 vessels, with a total tonnage of 13,412,065.

³ From G. B. Ravndal, *Turkey: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook*, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Promotion Series 28, p. 60.

TABLE II
Registered Net Tonnage (1924-1938)

Flag	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931
<i>General</i>								
American	169, 938	154, 000	126, 941	166, 809	203, 110	287, 187	468, 850	370, 802
British	1, 984, 783	2, 242, 000	2, 499, 471	2, 080, 330	1, 915, 053	2, 778, 946	3, 669, 816	3, 684, 132
Dutch	396, 799	323, 000			397, 654	422, 436	551, 458	669, 618
French	570, 412	627, 000	825, 039	831, 429	866, 010	897, 847	889, 318	1, 109, 469
German	260, 863	469, 000	464, 337	540, 817	576, 943	643, 566	806, 860	813, 099
Italian	1, 518, 052	1, 802, 000	2, 463, 861	2, 624, 822	2, 214, 586	3, 538, 205	4, 551, 027	5, 016, 973
Norwegian	112, 773	169, 000	362, 186		689, 853	905, 048	1, 108, 512	1, 451, 169
Polish	5, 191	9, 000			6, 335	7, 197	6, 916	
<i>Regional</i>								
Bulgarian	87, 183	92, 000	83, 701	87, 041	103, 509	117, 673	90, 016	
Egyptian	48, 876	151, 000			106, 509	112, 402	113, 968	
Greek	827, 000	1, 270, 000	2, 122, 861	1, 592, 795	779, 950	1, 243, 082	3, 400, 512	3, 351, 389
Palestinian								
Rumanian	364, 134	479, 000	550, 873	432, 331	468, 183	489, 164	547, 620	605, 816
Russian	172, 402	196, 000	188, 022	295, 004	468, 891	572, 095	612, 713	324, 472
Turkish ^{1 2}	715, 103	774, 000						
Yugoslav	36, 173	31, 000	143, 154	91, 422	22, 780	64, 948	167, 770	
Total	7, 646, 550	9, 178, 000	10, 643, 812	9, 897, 579	9, 218, 371	12, 767, 012	17, 864, 753	19, 198, 346

¹ The figures for Turkey, which are not included after 1925, do not include sailing vessels and coasting vessels from the Sea of Marmara, amounting to about 500,000 tons.

² The figures for Turkey, 1936-1941, are taken from *T. C. İstanbul Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Mecmuası (Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie d'Istanbul)*. They are not included in the total figures for the years indicated.

TABLE II
Registered Net Tonnage (1924-1938)—Continued

Flag	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936 * Aug. 15- Dec. 31, 1936	1937	1938
<i>General</i>							
American	196, 717	175, 850	147, 048	189, 252	108, 512	207, 013	275, 545
British	2, 847, 770	2, 616, 755	2, 586, 817	1, 986, 232	923, 796	2, 601, 497	2, 890, 184
Dutch	503, 676	562, 884	423, 356	353, 357	152, 852	569, 165	372, 842
French	1, 011, 056	524, 625	518, 136	394, 250	291, 201	1, 261, 999	408, 073
German	619, 064	655, 566	573, 083	452, 073	373, 323	754, 434	627, 384
Italian	4, 230, 477	4, 160, 918	3, 414, 456	2, 527, 164	799, 156	2, 167, 770	1, 604, 666
Norwegian	2, 104, 843	2, 232, 632	2, 165, 998	968, 032	229, 480	959, 658	743, 700
Polish					235, 264	187, 289	196, 998
<i>Regional</i>							
Bulgarian		91, 143	130, 873	135, 792	133, 022	180, 379	154, 413
Egyptian		103, 406	73, 454	45, 619	24, 881	30, 304	22, 881
Greek	2, 469, 396	2, 974, 505	2, 294, 990	1, 861, 400	341, 929	1, 648, 211	1, 576, 094
Palestinian					58, 964	75, 584	
Rumanian	643, 038	770, 399	749, 895	654, 788	474, 059	709, 536	647, 391
Russian	752, 340	985, 961	912, 792	1, 614, 564	338, 410	1, 111, 351	740, 098
Turkish ^{1 2}					2, 315, 981		2, 875, 777
Yugoslav		124, 841	101, 906	6, 080		57, 438	67, 040
Total	17, 514, 641	17, 445, 427	15, 504, 374	12, 322, 012	4, 781, 232	12, 957, 364	10, 762, 266

* There was no report, apparently, for the months of January to August 1936, since the Commission of the Straits ceased to function in the fall of 1936. The monthly figures in *Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie d'Istanbul* make a total of 18,219,990 tons for the entire year 1936, Turkish shipping included.

TABLE III
Commercial Shipping in the Marmara Region (1939-1945)¹

N—Number of ships
T—Net Tonnage

Country		1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Turkey	N	34 397	33 567	29 407	30 460	25 363	25 646	32 793
	T	4 273 136	4 369 125	4 645 182	4 671 998	4 095 023	4 766 453	5 616 509
France	N	41	59				2	
	T	121 075	102 553				26	
Great Britain	N	360	245	52				98
	T	775 952	542 818	69 887				565 208
Italy	N	506	377	11		6		
	T	715 941	268 263	23 598		11 652		
Greece	N	684	664	294	8	1	11	125
	T	227 811	247 481	25 038	438	54	136	13 464
Germany	N	188	32	21	11	14	15	
	T	330 638	29 637	20 994	4 423	15 373	6 458	
Belgium	N	2						
	T	2 664						
United States	N	91	52					191
	T	471 119	168 143					841 766
Soviet Union	N	74	60	24	3		1	
	T	157 318	128 025	53 813	8 061		45	
Rumania	N	201	162	58		4	2	5
	T	528 452	498 465	120 476		13 288	7 836	19 093
Netherlands	N	90	26					3
	T	103 184	29 035					10 839
Norway	N	45	3					14
	T	77 126	10 270					73 393
Denmark	N	14	2					
	T	20 486	2 282					
Bulgaria	N	95	54	24	9	14	34	34
	T	126 919	47 865	14 673	402	9 106	1 206	1 206
Hungary	N	32	32	11		4		
	T	13 824	12 871	4 413		1 232		
Egypt	N	15	7					
	T	22 822	13 249					
Poland	N	8						
	T	8 928						
Spain	N		6		23			
	T		7 194		38 107			2 200
Finland	N	6						
	T	6 386						
Japan	N	5	3					
	T	19 443	9 678					
Sweden	N	86	10				3	14
	T	96 864	13 743				2 513	21 613
Yugoslavia	N	23	18	2				1
	T	49 914	24 480	4 528				1 558
Others	N	54	53	31		1		2
	T	29 529	29 126	9 947		91		7 494
Total foreign shipping.	N	2 625	1 865	528	54	44	68	487
	T	3 906 395	2 185 178	347 367	51 431	50 796	18 220	1 557 834
General total. . .	N	37 022	35 432	29 935	30 514	25 407	25 714	33 280
	T	8 179 531	6 554 303	4 992 549	4 723 429	4 145 819	4 784 673	7 174 343

¹ Republique turque. Présidence de Conseil. Office central de statistique, *Annuaire Statistique* (1942-1945), vol. 15, p. 518.

TABLE IV
Commercial Shipping in the Straits, 1946¹

Country	Operating at Istanbul	Ships in transit	Total	Tonnage (Reg. net)
United States . . .	109	72	181	797,126
Soviet Union . . .	57	120	177	495,843
Great Britain . . .	42	11	53	151,307
Greece	67	12	79	142,950
Rumania	17	7	24	94,293
Yugoslavia	14	22	36	81,360
Norway	28	1	29	72,399
Sweden	45	1	46	57,072
Netherlands . . .	12	7	19	21,789
France	1	8	9	20,613
Italy	25	10	35	19,538
Denmark	4	3	7	15,563
Canada	1	3	4	12,219
Lebanon	7	...	7	11,273
Union of South Africa	4	...	4	10,832
Belgium	8	...	8	9,235
Panama	4	2	6	9,196
Bulgaria	12	...	12	8,821
Honduras	1	...	1	4,381
Poland	1	...	1	4,278
Palestine	1	...	1	3,425
Spain	1	...	1	1,037
Egypt	5	...	5	570
Hungary	1	...	1	518
Total . . .	467	279	746	2,045,638

¹ République turque. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Rapport Annuel sur le Mouvement des Navires à travers les Détroits*. Dixième Année—Janvier 1947. Ankara. Disisleri Bakanligi Basimevi. 1947. p. 9.

TABLE V
Commercial Shipping in the Straits, 1947¹

Country	Operating at Istanbul	Ships in transit	Total	Tonnage (Reg. net)
United States . . .	118	62	180	787,495
Soviet Union . . .	111	106	217	739,706
Great Britain . . .	75	17	92	228,173
Greece	52	30	82	142,546
Italy	128	8	136	127,755
Norway	39	16	55	125,256
Panama	31	15	46	109,995
Sweden	74	12	86	102,464
Rumania	15	14	29	94,073
Yugoslavia	22	15	37	77,700
Netherlands	17	11	28	46,735
Denmark	13	3	16	28,887
Lebanon	9	8	17	27,443
Canada	4	1	5	18,920
Bulgaria	44	33	77	17,431
Spain	6	...	6	13,088
Hungary	12	7	19	12,430
Belgium	11	1	12	11,900
Argentina	1	1	2	10,112
Honduras	3	...	3	6,927
Java	1	...	1	4,236
Egypt	8	3	11	4,302
Poland	2	1	3	3,818
Syria	1	...	1	365
Saudi Arabia . . .	1	...	1	240
Total . . .	798	364	1,162	2,741,997

¹ République turque. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. *Rapport Annuel sur le Mouvement des Navires à travers les Détroits*. Onzième Année—Janvier 1948. p. 9.

Footnotes

² *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941. Documents From the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Department of State publication 3023), here cited as *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*. The Soviet publication, consisting of 36 documents from the German archives and published in 1946, is: Arkhivnoe Upravlenie Ministerstva Inostrannikh Del SSSR. Dokumenty Ministerstva Inostrannikh Del Germanii. Vipusk II. *Germanskaiia Politika v. Turtsii* (1941-1943). OGIZ-Gospolitizdat, 1946. A French translation is: *La Politique Allemande, 1941-1943 v. Turquie. Documents Secrets du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne*. Traduit du russe par Madeleine et Michel Eristov (Paris, Dupont, 1946). Here cited as *Germanskaiia Politika v. Turtsii*. The Nürnberg documents are: Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, 8 vols.

³ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, vol. 346, col. 13; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents*

Diplomatiques, 1938-1939 (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1939), p. 109; Royal Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *The Greek White Book: Diplomatic Documents Relating to Italy's Aggression Against Greece* (London, Hutchinson, 1942), pp. 30-32; German Library of Information, *Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of the War* (New York, 1940; Berlin, 1939), pp. 309-340.

⁴ *Affaires Danubiennes*, no. 4, 1939, pp. 209-210; *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, vol. 347, col. 955; German Library of Information, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

⁵ In a comment of May 30, 1939, on the German-Italian alliance, Mussolini indicated the necessity of taking over the entire Balkan and Danubian area immediately after the first hours of war, noting: "By this lightning-like operation which is to be carried out decisively, not only the 'guaranteed states', like Greece, Rumania, and Turkey, would be out of the fight, but one would also protect one's back . . ." *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. V, pp. 453-455.

Footnotes—Continued

*German Library of Information, *op. cit.*, p. 343. On Apr. 21, 1939, Turkey gave a contract to a British company for building a naval base at Gelcuk.

**Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. IV, pp. 508-517; vol. VIII, pp. 519-520.

**Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 580-581.

**Ibid.*, vol. VII, pp. 752-754.

*For background, see especially *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 1-50, text, pp. 76-78.

**Ibid.*, pp. 157-158.

**Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

**Ibid.*, pp. 80-83.

*Saracoglu had been in touch with Gafenco, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, as a member of the Balkan Entente, and was asked to find out the Soviet attitude toward Balkan solidarity. Molotov was quite "cold" on this subject. Although there had been a preliminary Turkish-Soviet agreement concerning the Straits and a political agreement, Molotov turned down all Turkish suggestions which would have permitted Ankara to play any role on the side of the western powers or, in union with its Balkan neighbors, a preponderant role in the maintenance of peace and order in the region. See Gregoire Gafenco, *Préliminaires de la Guerre a l'Est, 1939-1941*, pp. 303-310.

**Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 105-106.

**Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

**Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

**Ibid.*, p. 97.

**Ibid.*, p. 110.

**Ibid.*, p. 111.

**Ibid.*, p. 113.

**Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

*Great Britain. Treaty of Mutual Assistance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom, the President of the French Republic, and the President of the Turkish Republic. Angora, Oct. 19, 1939. Cmd. 6135, Turkey No. 4 (1940).

*V. M. Molotov, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*. Report by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs at the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Oct. 31, 1939. See especially pp. 14-15.

**Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 144-194.

**Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

**Ibid.*, pp. 207-213.

**Ibid.*, pp. 216-217.

**Ibid.*, pp. 217-225.

**Ibid.*, pp. 226-234.

**Ibid.*, pp. 234-247.

**Ibid.*, pp. 247-254.

**Ibid.*, pp. 257-258.

**Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. III, pp. 403-407.

**Ibid.*, vol. VI, pp. 977-1002. There is no verification of this item in the German accounts of the Molotov conversations in Berlin.

**Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 258-259. In studying this proposal, which Molotov considered definitive and referred to a number of times later, it is well to bear in mind Imperial Russia's historic position as to the Straits as registered in the treaties of 1798, 1805, and 1833 and the Charykov proposal of 1911-12, as well as the Soviet-Turkish treaties of 1921 and 1922 and the Soviet support of claims to the Kars-Ardahan region in 1946. This claim was supported by the Soviet Representative, Mr. Vyshinsky, in the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on Oct. 24, 1947. For convenient reference to the treaties cited above see Harry N. Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Department of State publication 2752, Near Eastern Series 5), pp. 14-29.

*This proposal should be compared with the Soviet notes concerning the Straits on Aug. 7 and Sept. 24, 1946, and the American, British, and Turkish replies during this period. It will be noted that the proposals are substantially identical. For convenience see *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, pp. 47-68.

*It is probable that the Soviet position with respect to Iran, 1945, and later, should be considered in the light of the November 1940 position of the Soviet Union as well as in the light of the long historic past.

**Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 264-269.

**Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.

**Ibid.*, pp. 281-316.

**Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. IV, pp. 278-279, 475-477; vol. VI, pp. 938-939; vol. VIII, pp. 70-72.

**Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 316-320, 323-324, 326-327.

**Ibid.*, pp. 333-334; *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. III, pp. 633-634.

*The Yugoslav and Greek problems were discussed at Vienna on Apr. 22, 1941. Bulgaria claimed not only Yugoslav Macedonia and Western Thrace but also Salonika. Von Papen claims to have prevented Bulgarian occupation of Salonika, because, among other things, it would have made relations with Turkey difficult.

**Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. IV, pp. 499-508, for minutes of conference.

*This account is based on the Soviet publication of German documents, *Germanskaia Politika v. Turtsii*, 1941-1943, published in August 1946 while the Soviet Union was making demands on the Straits.

**Ibid.*, no. 7. See also *ibid.*, nos. 1-6, for background. At one point Germany was willing to promise Turkey territorial rectifications in the region of Edirne, along the Greek-Turkish Thracian frontier, and in the Aegean Islands.

**Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 347-349, 355-357, and *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. VI, pp. 977-1002.

*Doc. no. 456-PS, Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality.

**Germanskaia Politika v. Turtsii*, nos. 10-15, and Anthony Eden's statement in the House of Commons on

Jan. 8, 1942, following his return from Moscow (*Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, vol. 377, col. 373).

²¹ *Germanskaia Politika v. Turtsii*, nos. 12 and 17.

²² *Ibid.*, no. 16.

²³ For text of conversation, see BULLETIN of July 14, 1946, pp. 57-63.

²⁴ *Germanskaia Politika v. Turtsii*, nos. 22-36.

²⁵ See Mr. Churchill's address to the House of Commons on Feb. 11, 1943, *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, House of Commons*, vol. 386, cols. 1467-1488.

²⁶ Department of State press release 240, Mar. 24, 1947.

²⁷ BULLETIN of Dec. 11, 1943, p. 412.

²⁸ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, vol. 400, cols. 762-786. See also Mr. Eden's address to the House of Commons, Dec. 14, 1943.

During this period the German military estimates of the Turkish position indicated that while Turkey had re-

mained neutral, the closer Soviet armies came to the Balkans, the more difficult Turkey's position would be. Turkey's position was dominated by the Straits question; she had expansionist claims. Nevertheless, if Turkey changed its position, enemy operations against the Bulgarian-Rumanian Black Sea coast would have to be taken into account (*Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. VII, pp. 949-952, 954-955).

²⁹ *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, House of Commons*, vol. 400, cols. 1986-1988. The vessels in question included K.T. ships of about 800 tons, carrying two 3.7 inch guns and machine guns, an E.M.S. craft of about 40 or 50 tons, with a normal armament of one three pounder, machine guns, and depth charges. See also the Soviet note of Aug. 7, 1946, and the Turkish reply of Aug. 22, 1946, in *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, pp. 47-55, and the discussion, pp. 36-45.

³⁰ BULLETIN of Mar. 4, 1945, p. 373.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Specialised Agencies, Inter-Governmental Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and United Nations Organs in the Fields of Housing and Town and Country Planning. E/802, June 4, 1948. 23 pp. mimeo.

Report of the International Telecommunication Union. E/812, June 10, 1948. 12 pp. mimeo.

Second Report of the International Labour Organisation of the United Nations. E/810, June 9, 1948. [Covering document states Secretary-General has received report; attached is ILO printed report. 138 pp.]

Report on the Progress and Prospect of Repatriation, Resettlement and Immigration of Refugees and Displaced Persons. E/816, June 10, 1948. 67 pp. mimeo.

Translation of the Classics. Report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. E/823, June 16, 1948. 16 pp. mimeo.

Communication Dated 3 June 1948 from the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization to the Secretary-General Proposing Action for the Co-ordination of Procedures for Declarations of Death and Enclosing a Survey of the Problem. E/824, June 15, 1948. 17 pp. mimeo.

Official Records—Third Year:

Sixth Session. Supplement No. 3. Report of the Statistical Commission. E/577. 20 pp. Printed. 20¢.

—Supplement No. 3A, Report of the Sub-Commission on Statistical Sampling. E/CN.3/37. 18 pp. printed. 20¢.

Seventh Session. Supplement No. 3. Report of the Transport and Communications Commission. E/789. 30 pp. printed. 30¢.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Report of the Executive Board on the Nineteenth through Twenty-fifth Meetings Held at Lake Success, 9-12 March 1948. E/ICEF/56, Mar. 25, 1948. 43 pp. mimeo.

—Programme Committee. Note by the Executive Director on Utilization of New Resources. E/ICEF/57, Apr. 15, 1948. 8 pp. mimeo.

Report of the International Health Conference Held in New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946. E/772, Mar. 11, 1947. iv, 71 pp. Printed. 75¢.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Summary of Annual Reports of Governments for 1945. E/NR 1945/Summary. iv, 54 pp. Printed. 50¢.

Official Records, Second Year: Fourth Session. Supplement No. 7. Report of the Social Commission. 41 pp. Printed. 40¢.

—Supplement No. 9. First Report of the Secretary-General on activities under the Resolution on Relief Needs after the termination of UNRRA. E/269, Feb. 21, 1947. 29 pp. Printed. 30¢.

—Supplement No. 10. Report of the Working Group for Asia and the Far East. E/307/Rev. 1, Mar. 4, 1947. 81 pp. Printed. 80¢.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

Reaffirming the Policy of the United States in the United Nations

TEXT OF SENATE RESOLUTION 239 OF JUNE 11¹

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

CONCLUSIONS

The committee on May 19, 1948, by a vote of 13 to 0, approved the resolution. It recommends its prompt adoption. The major reasons for the action of the committee are summarized below:

1. A constructive program for the strengthening of the United Nations is essential for world peace. To this end, a clear expression of the Senate's views on the objectives which the United States should pursue will support the efforts of the executive branch in the United Nations and will make clear to world opinion the unity of this Government in regard to this program.

2. The United States cannot ignore the security aspect of world recovery. European recovery involves not only the economic elements covered by recently enacted legislation, but also international security considerations. These considerations have fundamental bearing alike upon successful economic recovery and upon world peace.

3. World peace—the paramount objective of the United States—can and should be bulwarked by the development of regional and other collective

arrangements among free nations for their self-defense consistent with the Charter. Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such arrangements as affect our national security and as are founded upon the practical principle of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will promote the security of all members of such arrangements, including our own.

4. The time is opportune for the United States to contribute to the maintenance of peace by making clear now its determination to defend itself against any armed attack affecting its national security, by exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in the Charter. Certainty in advance concerning this intention on the part of the United States should constitute a vital factor in deterring aggression.

5. Maximum efforts to complete the enforcement machinery of the United Nations and to

¹ Reported in the Senate on May 19, 1948, by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (S. Rept. 1361, 80th Cong., 2d sess.).

July 18, 1948

THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

achieve universal regulation and reduction of armaments, with effective safeguards, is obligatory upon every faithful member of the United Nations. The United States should continue to make vigorous efforts to this end.

The United Nations is the forum of negotiation of 58 nations. It is available daily to assist its members to resolve difficult issues between them. It will grow stronger only as members strive to improve it, to use its resources, to conduct their policies in accord with their obligations under its Charter. It is the considered judgment of the committee that world peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms will be advanced through the United Nations strengthened by the practical steps set forth in this resolution.

U.S., U.K., FRANCE, CANADA, AND BENELUX COUNTRIES DISCUSS S. RES. 239

[Released to the press July 6]

The Under Secretary of State on July 6 received the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Benelux countries for an informal and exploratory exchange of views concerning problems of common interest in relation to the Senate resolution of June 11, 1948. These conversations are expected to continue for some time. Since they are purely exploratory, no information concerning the substance of the conversations will be made public until such time as decisions may be reached.

Signing of Resolution Providing for U.S. Membership in WHO

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

President Truman issued the following statement on June 14, 1948, upon the occasion of his signing the joint resolution providing for United States membership in the World Health Organization and the instrument of acceptance of the constitution of the World Health Organization, the latter necessary for deposit with the United Nations.

"I have today signed a Joint Resolution providing for the U.S. membership and participation in the World Health Organization. I have at the same time signed the Instrument of Acceptance of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, which will immediately be sent to the United Nations for deposit.

"In view of the long history of effective international cooperation in the field of health which spares us the haunting fear of devastating epidemics of cholera and plague, we can look to the World Health Organization with hope and expectation. While performing its humane service, it will at the same time contribute to general economic improvement through the progressive development of healthy, alert, productive manpower. The world economy is seriously burdened, and unnecessarily so, by malaria, tuberculosis and other controllable diseases.

"The World Health Organization can help con-

tribute substantially to the attainment of the healthy, vigorous citizenry which the world needs so badly today and tomorrow.

"I am proud to have signed this Joint Resolution which makes it possible for the United States to continue its leadership in this important work. In the technical field of health we hold today a pre-eminent position. We must and will give freely of our great knowledge to help liberate men everywhere from the overhanging dread of preventable disease. In doing so through the World Health Organization we once again testify to our faith in the United Nations as the great instrument for reaching those goals of common understanding and mutual helpfulness among nations which alone can lead to peace and security for all peoples."

In view of some of the provisions included by the U.S. Congress in the joint resolution, the United Nations deferred acceptance of the deposit of the U.S. instrument of acceptance pending definitive action on the part of the World Health Assembly, which is currently in session in Geneva. On July 2, 1948, the Assembly unanimously approved United States membership in the World Health Organization. With this action, membership in the WHO has reached 50.

Department of State Bulletin

The United States in the United Nations

Reports on Trust Territories

Examination of Australia's annual report on its administration of the Trust Territory of New Guinea began in the Trusteeship Council at Lake Success on July 14. J. R. Halligan, Secretary of the Australian Department of External Territories, came from Canberra to answer the Council's questions about the written report and to provide any additional information required.

The Council had previously examined the Belgian report on Ruanda-Urundi, a trust territory located east of the Belgian Congo, in central Africa, and the British report on Tanganyika, an east-African territory which is the largest and most populous of the 10 former League mandates placed under U. N. trusteeship. Drafting committees are now formulating the observations of the Council on these two reports.

Territories on which reports will be considered at later sessions are Togoland and the Cameroons, under British and French administration, Nauru, under Australian administration, and Western Samoa, under New Zealand. The question whether the Trusteeship Council or the Security Council will examine any report submitted by the United States on the Pacific Islands formerly mandated to Japan depends largely on the still unsettled issue of the two councils' relations regarding strategic trusteeships.¹

Reports of administering authorities are written on the basis of a questionnaire formulated by the Trusteeship Council. They cover almost every phase of political, economic, social, and educational advancement in the territories and indicate the extent to which the administering authority is carrying out the objectives of the trusteeship system laid down in article 76 of the Charter.

The Council has closely questioned the representatives of the administering authorities. Ambassador Francis B. Sayre of the United States has in the case of all three territories expressed a special interest in educational programs for the indigenous peoples. In the cases of both Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika he urged acceleration of efforts to establish universal elementary education for indigenous children and pointed out the necessity for increased teacher training. Regarding Ruanda-Urundi, Mr. Sayre said he thought it desirable for the Belgian administration to establish public schools to complement the present mission schools and to insure adequate instructional standards for all schools in the territory.

Discussion of the New Guinea report began with consideration of a plan now pending in the Australian Parliament for consolidating the administration of the trust territory with that of the adjoining Australian territory of Papua. Mr. Sayre, conceding that the trusteeship agreement authorized such an arrangement, expressed once more the concern of the United States that administrative unions should not have the practical effect of impeding the operation of the international trusteeship system, should not alter the status or separate identity of a trust territory, and should not prevent submission to the Council of information, statistical or otherwise, bearing expressly on the trust territory.²

The 1948 visiting mission of the Trusteeship Council, composed of E. W. P. Chinnery, of Australia, Lin Mou-sheng, of China, Robert E. Woodbridge, of Costa Rica, and Henri Laurentia, of France, left Lake Success July 15 for East Africa. The mission will travel in Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika until mid-September and will report to the Council by October 31.

Palestine

Count Folke Bernadotte, the U.N. mediator in Palestine, appeared before the Security Council July 13 to make a personal report on the four-week truce which expired July 9 and on the failure of his efforts to have it extended.

The same day Philip C. Jessup of the United States introduced a draft resolution which was adopted by the Council late on July 15 with some amendments and with a few changes proposed by the United States to meet some of the criticisms made during three days of debate.

In final form the resolution called for a cease-fire in Palestine under article 40, to be effective within three days; declared that noncompliance would lead to consideration of further action under chapter VII; ordered an immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem; instructed the mediator to work for the demilitarization of Jerusalem and to continue his supervision of truce observance; and ruled that, "subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly", the truce shall remain in force until the Palestine situation is peacefully adjusted.

In introducing the U.S. draft resolution, Mr. Jessup said the mediator's report made it clear

¹ BULLETIN of July 4, 1948, p. 15, and June 27, 1948, p. 830.

² BULLETIN of July 4, 1948, p. 15.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

that the Security Council must face its responsibility and order the fighting to stop. By deciding that the truce should stay in force until a peaceful settlement was effected, Mr. Jessup said, the Council would make it clear "that it insists that the Palestine problem is not to be solved by force."

The Council voted separately on each of the resolution's 12 paragraphs. The paragraph ordering an immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem was adopted unanimously. Composition of the majorities which passed other paragraphs varied considerably. The fact that the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine voted for several paragraphs on which China and Argentina abstained, and vice versa, assured passage of a number of paragraphs whose fate had been in doubt. On final passage of the resolution as a whole, the vote was seven in favor (Canada, China, Colombia, Belgium, France, U.K., U.S.), Syria against, and three abstentions (Argentina, Ukraine, and the U.S.S.R.).

Charter Revision

The Interim Committee adopted on July 9 a proposal by José Arce of Argentina that it ask the General Assembly to consider calling a general conference of U.N. members to review the Charter. The vote was 19-7 with 10 abstentions, including that of China. The United States, United Kingdom, and France voted no, Joseph E. Johnson, of the United States, arguing that a general conference at this time would be ineffective.

Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council will open its seventh session at Geneva on July 19 with a record agenda of 50 items. In the social field, the Council will consider the completed draft of the Declaration of Human Rights, a draft convention on the crime of genocide, and a survey of forced labor and measures for its abolition. Among the economic items for the Council's consideration are reports from the various regional economic commissions, including the report of the *ad hoc* committee on the factors bearing upon the establishment of an Economic Commission for the Middle East and the principle of equal pay for equal work. The U. S. Delegation will be headed by Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for economic affairs, with Leroy D. Stinebower, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, and Walter M. Kotschnig, Chief of the Division of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, serving as Deputy U. S. Representatives.

Health Assembly

The first World Health Assembly, which opened in Geneva on June 24, approved the recommendations of its Program Committee to set up international programs for malaria, maternal and child health, tuberculosis, and venereal disease. The

Program Committee has also recommended continuation and expansion of the network of epidemic-control services. The Assembly also approved a committee recommendation providing for the establishment of five World Health Organization regional offices in the eastern Mediterranean, western Pacific, southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa, when the consent of members in the area is obtained. A Latin American regional office was not included because of current negotiations designed to integrate the Pan American Sanitary Bureau with WHO. The United States was elected a member of the WHO Executive Board by the Assembly on July 13.

Labor Conference

The International Labor Organization concluded its Thirty-first Conference in San Francisco on July 10, approving two new conventions and revising two earlier ones. Of the two new conventions, one would guarantee freedom of association to workers and employers and the other requires governments to maintain free public employment services. These conventions will be submitted to member states of the ILO for ratification.

Revisions were made of two earlier international conventions concerning night work for women and for young persons, providing for more liberal interpretations of these treaties. The Conference also agreed to discuss labor clauses in public contracts, protection of worker's earnings, and the general question of wages, at its 1949 conference, as well as other labor items. The Conference gave final approval to a resolution requesting the ILO's Governing Body to consult with the competent U.N. organs to examine the measures necessary to insure the safeguarding of freedom of association. The Conference voted to hold its 1949 session in Geneva.

India-Pakistan Dispute

The U.N. Commission on India and Pakistan arrived in Karachi on July 7 and paid an informal visit on the following day to the Pakistani Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The Commission held its first formal meeting in New Delhi on July 13, after having called on the Indian Prime Minister and Governor-General.

U. S. Representation

President Truman, by recess appointment, named H. Merle Cochran, U.S. Foreign Service officer with the rank of career minister, to succeed Coert duBois as the U.S. Representative on the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices in Indonesia. Mr. duBois asked to be relieved of his duties because of illness. Mr. Cochran has been a Foreign Service officer since 1914, except for one brief interruption.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Report on Sixth Meeting of Preparatory Commission for IRO

by George L. Warren

The Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization met for the sixth time at Geneva on May 4, 1948.¹ The purpose of the meeting was to consider the status of adherences to the Iro constitution, to examine financial reports, to receive the report of the Executive Secretary, and to take such action thereon as might be indicated. The Commission had assumed operating responsibilities on behalf of Iro on July 1, 1947, for the care, repatriation, and resettlement of refugees.

The Commission was advised that since the last meeting the Governments of Argentina, Belgium and France had deposited certificates of ratification to the Iro constitution with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, thus bringing the number of adherences to Iro to 14. The adherence of one additional government is required in order to bring the Iro into being. The total percentage of governments' contributions is now 76.74 percent. The Brazilian Delegate announced that a working agreement had been satisfactorily concluded between his government and the Preparatory Commission and that ratification legislation had been presented to the Brazilian Congress. He expressed the hope that Brazil might complete its adherence before the next meeting of the Commission. The Commission was also advised that the Governments of Denmark, Sweden, and Venezuela are giving serious consideration to adherence.

At the opening of the meeting the Executive Secretary appealed to the governments to act more generously in receiving displaced persons, stating that he regarded the current rate of movement in resettlement as inadequate to resolve the problem of displaced persons within the anticipated time of three years.

During the meeting the Commission was addressed by Hector McNeil, M.P., Minister of State of the United Kingdom, and by Pierre Schneider, French Secretary of State for German and Austrian Affairs. Mr. McNeil promised the continuing support of his government in the efforts of the Commission, and Mr. Schneider proposed the bodily transfer to other countries of assembly centers in which displaced persons are housed in accordance with a plan of fair distribution. He suggested that the Preparatory Commission could continue its efforts at resettlement in the countries to which the centers might be transferred and argued that the proposed transfer of the centers would contribute substantially to the peace and order of central Europe.

The Commission noted the fact that the impossibility of conclusively establishing the decease of large numbers of war victims was proving an obstacle to the accomplishment of many legal actions which relatives of these persons require to execute. Hence the Commission referred to the Economic and Social Council the question of the wisdom of drafting an international convention as a measure of relief for the persons concerned.

The Commission also approved a draft agreement of relationship between the United Nations and the Iro based on the standard text for such agreements, and appointed a negotiating committee consisting of the delegates from Brazil, Canada, China, and Norway to conduct negotiations with a similar committee of the Economic and Social Council during its seventh session in Geneva in the summer of 1948.

The Commission also considered the financial report and statements for the six months' period ending December 31, 1947, which showed total income as of that date to be \$43,913,680; expenditures, \$33,441,922; and cash on hand, \$10,471,758. The balance sheet showed assets of \$21,607,210, liabilities of \$20,869,630, and an excess of funds received over funds applied of \$737,580. The Commission took note of the financial report and statements and was advised by the Executive Secretary that every effort would be made to present to the next meeting of the Commission an audited financial report for the period ending June 30, 1948. The Commission, recognizing that it would not reconvene before June 30, 1948, and that it was not feasible for the Executive Secretary to present at the current meeting a plan of expenditures based on anticipated income for the fiscal year 1948-49, authorized the Executive Secretary to make administrative and operational expenditures in the period from July 1 to September 30, 1948, at a rate equal to one fourth of the respective expenditures in the administrative and operational budgets for the present fiscal year. The Commission also authorized the Executive Secretary to include for expenditure during the above period amounts he deemed prudent from any funds that might be carried forward from the fiscal year 1947-48 in accordance with paragraph 1 of annex II to the constitution.

¹ For the report of the fifth meeting of the Preparatory Commission for Iro, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1948, p. 451.

ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS

The Commission considered the recommendations made by the Executive Secretary in his report on the repatriation and resettlement policy of the Organization to the effect that the realization of a "fair share" plan should continue to be pursued. The Commission urged upon receiving countries the most generous methods of selection, the maximum feasible relaxation of immigration requirements, recognition of the family unit in selection, and the adoption of measures of selection minimizing the return of refugees and displaced persons from receiving countries. The Commission noted that the two main factors retarding the rate of resettlement were inadequacy of ocean shipping and lack of housing facilities, particularly in western European receiving countries.

The Commission considered the Executive Secretary's report on progress made during the period January to April 1948 with respect to financial administration, agreements with governments, eligibility, health, care and maintenance, supply and transport, repatriation, resettlement, legal and other protection, and administration. Particular attention was given to the needs of the Organization with respect to shipping and all government members were requested to re-examine the possibilities of making more ships available to the Commission.

The Commission recessed on May 12, 1948, to reconvene on or about August 20, 1948, for the purpose of convening the General Council of the Iro on or about August 23, 1948. It was assumed that the constitution of the Organization would come into force before that date. On invitation of the Executive Secretary the United States Delegate addressed the headquarters staff of the Preparatory Commission May 15, 1948, after the Commission had adjourned.

U.S. DELEGATION TO NORTH PACIFIC REGIONAL AIR NAVIGATION MEETING OF ICAO

[Released to the press July 7]

The Department of State announced on July 7 the composition of the United States Delegation to the North Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), scheduled to convene at Seattle on July 13, 1948. The United States Delegation is as follows:

Chairman

Clifford P. Burton, Chief of Technical Mission, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Members

Luther R. Hayes, Adviser, International Telecommunications Standards, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Donald C. House, Assistant Chief, International Aviation Section, United States Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce

Lt. Comdr. J. D. McCubbin, U. S. C. G., Search and Rescue Agency, Department of the Treasury

Raymond F. Nicholson, Representative, Flight Operations, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Francis J. Rhody, Special Adviser to the Assistant Administrator for Airports, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Walter B. Swanson, Adviser, International Air Traffic Control Standards, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Advisers

James S. Anderson, Vice President-International, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., Washington, D.C.

Oscar Bakke, Technical Assistant, International Standards Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Capt. F. A. Berry, Jr., U.S.N., Officer in Charge, U.S. Navy Weather Central, Department of the Navy

James D. Durkee, Chief, International Branch, Aviation Division, Federal Communications Commission

Lt. Comdr. Benjamin F. Engel, U.S.C.G., Communications Division, Department of the Treasury

Maj. Grove C. Johnson, U.S.A.F., Acting Assistant Chief, ICAO Liaison Section, Department of the Air Force

Victor J. Kayne, ICAO-Air Traffic Control Regional Representative, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Comdr. Donald E. MacIntosh, ICAO Coordinator, Department of the Navy

Lt. Col. Norman J. McGowan, Chief, Air Surveillance Branch, Directorate of Communications, Hq. U.S.A.F., Department of the Air Force

John R. Mercer, Chief, Landing Areas Section, Airways Engineering Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Donald W. Nyrop, Operations Division, Air Transport Association of America, Washington, D.C.

George L. Rand, Representative, International Telecommunications Standards, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

R. D. Shall, Regional Foreign Staff Officer, Sixth Region, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Stenographers

E. Vernice Anderson, Personal Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Communications, Department of State

Mary E. Bean, Administrative Assistant, ICAO Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

The purpose of the meeting is to examine the problems of air navigation in the North Pacific region. The delegates will prepare a plan of navigational services and facilities needed in the region to assure compliance with the standards established and the practices recommended by the ICAO Council. The meeting is expected to last from two to three weeks.

Department of State Bulletin

THE RECORD OF THE WEEK

U.S. Protests Soviet Blockade of Berlin

NOTE FROM SECRETARY MARSHALL TO AMBASSADOR PANYUSHKIN

[Released to the press July 9]

July 6, 1948

EXCELLENCY: The United States Government wishes to call to the attention of the Soviet Government the extremely serious international situation which has been brought about by the actions of the Soviet Government in imposing restrictive measures on transport which amount now to a blockade against the sectors in Berlin occupied by the United States, United Kingdom and France. The United States Government regards these measures of blockade as a clear violation of existing agreements concerning the administration of Berlin by the four occupying powers.

The rights of the United States as a joint occupying power in Berlin derive from the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany. The international agreements undertaken in connection therewith by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union defined the zones in Germany and the sectors in Berlin which are occupied by these powers. They established the quadripartite control of Berlin on a basis of friendly cooperation which the Government of the United States earnestly desires to continue to pursue.

These agreements implied the right of free access to Berlin. This right has long been confirmed by usage. It was directly specified in a message sent by President Truman to Premier Stalin on June 14, 1945, which agreed to the withdrawal of United States forces to the zonal boundaries, provided satisfactory arrangements could be entered into between the military commanders, which would give access by rail, road and air to United States forces in Berlin. Premier Stalin replied on June 16 suggesting a change in date but no other alteration in the plan proposed by the President. Premier Stalin then gave assurances that all necessary measures would be taken in accordance with the plan. Correspondence in a similar sense took place between Premier Stalin and Mr. Churchill. In accordance with this understanding, the United States, whose armies had penetrated deep into Saxony and Thuringia, parts of the Soviet zone, withdrew its forces to its own area of occupation in Germany and took up its position in its own sector in Berlin. Thereupon the agreements in regard to the occupation of Germany and Berlin went into effect. The United

States would not have so withdrawn its troops from a large area now occupied by the Soviet Union had there been any doubt whatsoever about the observance of its agreed right of free access to its sector of Berlin. The right of the United States to its position in Berlin thus stems from precisely the same source as the right of the Soviet Union. It is impossible to assert the latter and deny the former.

It clearly results from these undertakings that Berlin is not a part of the Soviet zone, but is an international zone of occupation. Commitments entered into in good faith by the zone commanders, and subsequently confirmed by the Allied Control Authority, as well as practices sanctioned by usage, guarantee the United States together with other powers, free access to Berlin for the purpose of fulfilling its responsibilities as an occupying power. The facts are plain. Their meaning is clear. Any other interpretation would offend all the rules of comity and reason.

In order that there should be no misunderstanding whatsoever on this point, the United States Government categorically asserts that it is in occupation of its sector in Berlin with free access thereto as a matter of established right deriving from the defeat and surrender of Germany and confirmed by formal agreements among the principal Allies. It further declares that it will not be induced by threats, pressures or other actions to abandon these rights. It is hoped that the Soviet Government entertains no doubts whatsoever on this point.

This Government now shares with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom the responsibility initially undertaken at Soviet request on July 7, 1945, for the physical well-being of 2,400,000 persons in the western sectors of Berlin. Restrictions recently imposed by the Soviet authorities in Berlin have operated to prevent this Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France from fulfilling that responsibility in an adequate manner.

The responsibility which this Government bears for the physical well-being and the safety of the German population in its sector of Berlin is outstandingly humanitarian in character. This population includes hundreds of thousands of women and children, whose health and safety are dependent on the continued use of adequate facilities for moving food, medical supplies and other

July 18, 1948

items indispensable to the maintenance of human life in the western sectors of Berlin. The most elemental of these human rights which both our Governments are solemnly pledged to protect are thus placed in jeopardy by these restrictions. It is intolerable that any one of the occupying authorities should attempt to impose a blockade upon the people of Berlin.

The United States Government is therefore obliged to insist that in accordance with existing agreements the arrangements for the movement of freight and passenger traffic between the western zones and Berlin be fully restored. There can be no question of delay in the restoration of these essential services, since the needs of the civilian population in the Berlin area are imperative.

Holding these urgent views regarding its rights and obligations in the United States sector of Berlin, yet eager always to resolve controversies in the spirit of fair consideration for the viewpoints of all concerned, the Government of the United States declares that duress should not be invoked as a method of attempting to dispose of any disagreements which may exist between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States in respect of any aspect of the Berlin situation.

Such disagreements if any should be settled by negotiation or by any of the other peaceful methods provided for in Article 33 of the Charter in keeping with our mutual pledges as copartners in the United Nations. For these reasons the Government of the United States is ready as a first step to participate in negotiations in Berlin among the four Allied Occupying Authorities for the settlement of any question in dispute arising out of the administration of the city of Berlin. It is, however, a prerequisite that the lines of communication and the movement of persons and goods between the United Kingdom, the United States and the French sectors in Berlin and the Western Zones shall have been fully restored.

Accept [etc.]



His Excellency
ALEXANDER S. PANYUSHKIN,
*Ambassador of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.*

Reply to Polish Protest Concerning Six-Power Talks on Germany

NOTE FROM UNDER SECRETARY LOVETT TO AMBASSADOR WINIEWICZ

[Released to the press July 7]

July 6, 1948

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 51/41/48 of June 18, 1948, protesting on behalf of your Government the recommendations resulting from the Six-Power talks on Germany, recently held in London, on the grounds that the participants were "not competent and not empowered to deal with these problems". You stressed your Government's opposition to many of the recommendations as being contrary to existing international agreements and your Government's belief that all matters involving the future of Germany should be the exclusive concern of the Council of Foreign Ministers. I noted with particular interest your observation that "any possible difficulties in reconciling the positions within the Council cannot be insuperable, if all the Powers will abide by the Potsdam agreements."

I need hardly remind you of my Government's

persistent efforts to achieve four-power agreement on Germany on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement. I discussed this point in my note to you of September 30, 1947, in connection with the decision to revise the level of industry in the Anglo-American zone. The record clearly shows that the continuing efforts of my Government to achieve an equitable solution of the German problem in the Council of Foreign Ministers and in the Allied Control Council in Berlin have been fruitless largely as a result of the intransigent attitude of one of the occupying powers. The records of the Control Council as of March 1948 show that the Soviet representative has vetoed the agreed decisions of the other three powers in 69 instances—nearly three times the combined number of vetoes exercised by the other powers. As explained in my note under reference, it is because of the repeated failure over a period of three years to achieve four-power agreement that my Government "feels justified in pursuing ob-

jectives which have been commonly agreed and making arrangements for that purpose with any other occupying power willing to work toward the common end."

My Government agrees with your Government that German resources ought to be used for the benefit of the general reconstruction of Europe rather than for the reconstruction of only a part of Europe. The United States has consistently endeavored to implement the clear understanding in the Potsdam Agreement that Germany, including the Soviet Zone, should be treated as an economic whole and it has consistently striven to create those conditions which would lead to the establishment of a democratic German state capable of assisting the reconstruction of all the devastated countries of Europe and yet not constituting a threat to the security of those nations. The assertion that the United States has sought to divide Germany or to divide Europe is without any foundation. The fact that its offer to assist the general European recovery has not been accepted by certain countries, including Poland, has of necessity limited the application of that recovery program to those countries which have accepted it. The apparent division of Germany today after three years of unsuccessful attempts to hold it together is greatly deplored by my Government. Here again the necessity to confine our joint program in German to Western Germany is not of our making and certainly not in accordance with our wishes. The fact that the efforts of the United States toward the rehabilitation of Europe now have to be concentrated on the program for Western Europe, including Western Germany, is a direct result of the failure of the other countries of Europe at the instigation of the Soviet Union to join in a common program looking toward the rehabilitation of all Europe.

With regard to the substance of the London recommendations I must point out that there was no attempt in these talks to cover all aspects of the German problem. Therefore, there is no basis for your protesting the fact that the problem of reparations was omitted in the recommendations of the conference, a conference which you have insisted had no right to discuss any matters relating to Germany.

I must take exception to your comments on the recommendations concerning security and your statement that the fundamental aim of removing Germany's economic basis of aggression has been ignored. It should not be necessary for me to remind you that the United States has twice been engaged in major wars with Germany and that it is vitally interested in preventing a recurrence of German aggression. Security considerations, far from having been relegated to a secondary posi-

tion, were constantly in mind throughout the London discussions as should be evident from the communiqué reporting the final recommendations. This problem has of course become more complicated as a result of the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to join the other occupying powers in a long term treaty guaranteeing the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. The London recommendations on the Ruhr and on general security make specific provision against the rebuilding of German economic power as a means to future aggression.

Your comments on the plan for the control of the Ruhr have, I believe, been answered in the general discussion above with respect to the division of Germany and of Europe. It should be observed that the program for the rehabilitation of Western Germany does not exclude that area from trade relations with Eastern Europe but, on the contrary, seeks to foster such trade in the common interest. If certain countries "who suffered most in consequence of German aggression" claim that their interests are not sufficiently taken into account by the program planned for Western Germany, their complaint should not be addressed to the United States Government but to the Government primarily responsible for preventing these countries from cooperating in the general recovery program for Europe. In the same way it seems to me that your protest against the failure to utilize quadripartite consultative machinery, should more appropriately be addressed to the occupying power responsible for the present deplorable division of Europe and Germany.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

ROBERT A. LOVETT

His Excellency

JOSEF WINIEWICZ,

Ambassador of Poland.

Letters of Credence

Czechoslovakia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Vladimir Outrata, presented his credentials to the President on June 21. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the President's reply, see Department of State press release 501 of June 21, 1948.

Panama

The newly appointed Ambassador of Panama, Señor Don Octavio A. Vallarino, presented his credentials to the President on June 24. For the text of the translation of the Ambassador's remarks and for the President's reply, see Department of State press release 506 of June 24, 1948.

U.S. Information Program

BY GEORGE V. ALLEN¹

Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

We are frequently asked in the Department to state the *aims* of our foreign information program. The answer, I believe, is not difficult to formulate. Our information program is nothing more, nor less, than an instrument—one of the instruments—in achieving the foreign policy of the United States. That policy has today one paramount aim, the preservation of democracy as we understand and have always used the term. We seek the preservation of democracy in the United States and assist the free peoples of the world in preserving their liberties. We hope that in due course other peoples who have lost their liberties will be able to regain them.

The information program is but one of the implements we employ in our efforts to achieve our great foreign-policy objective. I would by no means claim that it is our most important implement. Our financial and economic efforts to assist in the economic recovery of Europe are perhaps our outstanding implementation of foreign policy today. What we *are* remains more important than what we *say* we are. *Doing* is more important than *saying*, or *promising*, or *boasting*. Indeed, so true is this doctrine that we waste our energy, our manpower, and our resources if we say anything at all in our information program except what we are, or what we do, or what we genuinely expect or hope to do.

I have frequently tried to assess why it was that Nazi Germany, the country which devoted more time and effort and money than any other nation to the work of information, or propaganda if you wish, had so little propaganda success. Herr Goebbels, the outstanding protagonist of the propaganda technique, succeeded, during the recent war, in achieving perhaps the greatest single success, as far as gaining a *large listener audience* is conceived, when he put "Lord Haw Haw" on Radio Berlin. Many of you will recall the eagerness with which Americans tuned their shortwave dials during the war, trying to hear what "Haw Haw" had to say. During the worst days of the bombing of Britain, residents of London still tuned their dials to listen to him. There is no doubt that Goebbels

succeeded in getting a great and eager listening audience. The Japanese achieved the same sort of success in the Pacific, with a girl called "Tokyo Rose". Our soldiers sat in foxholes in Guadalcanal and Guam, scanning their watches to be certain to hear her daily transmissions. If the task of a propagandist is to get *listeners*, the Nazis and Japanese scored tremendous successes.

But no one has produced any evidence that "Haw Haw" made the British military or civilian population fight one whit less hard through six years of war. Nor did the blandishments of "Tokyo Rose" have any harmful effect on the fighting spirit of our Marines at Tinian. Quite the contrary. The German and Japanese propagandists only succeeded in increasing our determination. Their money and effort were worse than thrown away.

Why did they not succeed? I have asked myself this question often during the past three months, since I began considering this subject. The answer, I believe, is relatively simple. The Japanese and Nazis failed because they did not tell the truth. They told a few truths, yes, regarding bombing targets and raid objectives—enough to give a similarity of truth and to attract listeners, but the *basic underlying theme* of their broadcasts was not truth, and our listeners marked it down as easily recognizable propaganda.

Americans have always felt, rather instinctively, that the best way to conduct an information program is to tell the truth, and only the truth; but I had not realized, until going into the question, just why this is so. I am fully convinced that if our information program is not based on truth we had better close down all our broadcasts and call home all our press attachés from our Embassies abroad.

The primary advantage we have over the propaganda efforts of totalitarian states today is the fact that we Americans are not obliged to present ourselves to the world as models of perfection. The U.S. has so many virtues to overcome its shortcomings that we need not fear the effect of our being truly known abroad.

Totalitarian propagandists must picture their country as a paradise on earth, where everything is perfect, and must proclaim that everything in democratic countries is wicked and debased.

In our information activity, we must present our

¹ Excerpts from an address made at the Mount Holyoke College Institute of the United Nations, South Hadley, Mass., on June 29, 1948, and released to the press on the same date.

civilization in its true color if we are to be effective. That color is gray—not lily-white. We have the enormous advantage in our information program that we are willing to admit our imperfections and to tell the truth as nearly as we can ascertain it.

If, however, those in the State Department and elsewhere who are in charge of our information work should ever become subject to the daily fear that they might say something objectionable to some official, or suppress unpleasant facts for fear of losing their jobs, the result would eventually be that we would water down our scripts until American broadcasts would become merely the counterparts of that of the totalitarian propaganda: America would be presented to the world as the home only of sweetness and light. And the world would be no more convinced by our broadcasts than they are by totalitarian efforts.

I do not pretend that the truth is any easier to ascertain today than it was in the days of jesting Pilate. But we must be motivated always by the effort to find it out, and to state it clearly and boldly as nearly as we can.

As many of you may know, the formalized effort of governments to influence people outside their borders through organized information or propaganda programs is a relatively recent development. The first scheduled shortwave broadcasts in a foreign language by any government, for example, were inaugurated by the Nazis in 1936, I believe, when Herr Goebbels put on a Russian-language program beamed to the U.S.S.R. (Private American broadcasters began broadcasting in Spanish to Latin America as early as 1929, but entirely as a commercial venture without Government sponsorship.)

The British Broadcasting System inaugurated its foreign-language broadcasts in 1938, as I recall, using at first German, Russian, and French. Radio Moscow began to speak in German, French, English, and other languages about the same time.

The American Government's entry into the foreign information field came in 1942, as a result of the war. Two independent agencies of the Government in Washington were given the responsibility for this program. These were the Office of Inter-American Affairs under Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, for Latin America, and the Office of War Information, under Mr. Elmer Davis, for the remainder of the world.

At the close of the war, in the fall of 1945, these two agencies were transferred to the Department of State, and that Department found itself charged, for the first time, with responsibility for our foreign information program. The primary job at the start was a liquidating operation. My predecessor, Mr. William Benton, had the task, for example, of reducing the 13,000 employees in OWI by 90 percent.

There was considerable doubt in the minds of Congress, private information-media officials, and

others concerning the propriety of the U.S. Government's continuing in the information field during peacetime. Most people hoped that since Nazi Germany, the Government which had perverted information to propaganda purposes, had been defeated, the victorious Allies would continue to associate harmoniously in peace as they had in war, through the newly formed United Nations. It was hoped that misunderstandings and misrepresentations of motives among nations would be reduced to a point where no official information program by the U.S. would be required. Publishers of American newspapers, magazines, and books, and officials of American radio networks and motion picture studios felt they could do a better job than the Government in telling the American story abroad.

Debate on the subject was at its height in the summer of 1947, when many members of the U.S. Congress visited Europe and the Near East. They were amazed at the extent of misunderstanding and wilful misrepresentation of the U.S. which they found abroad. They returned to enact legislation, known as the Mundt-Smith act, signed January 27, 1948, providing for an official foreign information program as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign relations.

It is under this act that we now operate. Our information work is conducted primarily through three divisions, handling radio, press, and motion pictures. We also disseminate information abroad through 50 U.S. Government libraries. These libraries are considered primarily as educational institutions and are administered under our separate educational program, but the American newspapers and periodicals displayed on our library tables abroad are predominantly informational in character. There is considerable question whether educational and informational work can be sharply delineated. Someone has characterized our entire information program as "adult education".

The most conspicuous of our official information activities, as far as the American public is concerned, has always been the shortwave radio programs beamed abroad, known as the "Voice of America".

Much has been heard recently of the congressional investigations of the Voice of America. I do not propose to dwell on this subject tonight, except to say that I regard the investigations as having served a highly salutary purpose. They have clarified the atmosphere and have brought to light misunderstandings regarding responsibility and laxness in supervision which ought not to have been allowed to continue. I may add that I have often thought, during these recent congressional hearings, of the opinion expressed, I believe, by Lord Bryce in his monumental study of the American commonwealth, that the single most important contribution made by the American Gov-

ernment to political science has been the congressional investigation. This thought has sustained me through many days of such investigations during the past three weeks.

I wish to refer at this time, however, to another voice, which I would like to call the Voice of Democracy. I do not have in mind any radio program, either domestic or foreign. I refer to the Voice, or the synthesis of the voices, of all mankind throughout the world, who believe in the principles of individual freedom and human liberty.

This Voice should find its principal outlet in the various organs and independent agencies of the United Nations. The American people regard the United Nations as having been founded on the principles of democracy as we understand the term. Woven through the warp and woof of U. N. and all of its constituent parts, notably in the Charter of UNESCO, is the concept that the human mind and spirit should be free from the chains of repressive government.

Perhaps the most frequently discussed of the many human rights and aspirations is the freedom of speech. (And now we have added to that, in the United States, not only the right to speak, but also the right to speak *loudly*, since the Supreme Court upheld the right, in principle, of a religious group to use mechanical loud speakers in the propagation of its faith.)

A companion piece to the right of man to speak freely is the equal right of an individual to *listen*, in this modern age of radio communication. To this we must also list, as David Sarnoff has pointed out, the freedom to *look*, in these growing days of television.

Membership in the United Nations carries with it an obligation on the part of every member government to permit its citizens the full right to speak and the right to read and to listen and to look at news and ideas depicted in the press, radio, and all other information media without regard to national boundaries. Only in this way can the voice of the world's people, the Voice of Democracy, be created.

The Secretariat of the United Nations has conceived an excellent plan for a greatly increased information program, to disseminate knowledge of the activities of U. N. through press, radio, and pictures. This is an excellent project, and the facilities of the American Government, especially in the field of shortwave radio broadcasting, will be made available to U. N. to the maximum feasible extent, to assist in this most desirable project. But the official Voice of the United Nations is not what I have in mind. The Voice of Democracy today is the combined expression of every newspaper and every radio program, every public speaker and private discussion group, in the United States and in every other nation in the world where man is free to make his opinions

heard. Anyone at Lake Success who speaks on behalf of genuine democracy is a part of that voice.

The struggle in the world today, as President Truman has recently indicated, is not a struggle between two powerful nations. It is a struggle between two concepts or ideas. I do not hesitate to place it on the level of a struggle between good and evil, the good represented by human liberty and the evil by the totalitarian police state.

My experience in Iran during the past two years has caused me to visualize this conflict more clearly than I had before. Some of my Iranian friends who did not understand the nature of the conflict were quite frank in saying to me: "Why must Iran, a relatively small and weak country, continue to be involved, against its will, in great-power struggles? Why can't we be left alone, to live our own lives without disturbing or being disturbed by anyone? As for the quarrel between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., a plague on both your houses!"

If the contest in the world today were merely another contest between two opposing imperialisms, one could sympathize fully with this attitude. But it is *not* such a struggle. I make that declaration flatly and bluntly, despite certain groups, even in the United States, who regard the present world difficulties in very much the same light as did my Iranian friends to whom I have referred.

In the struggle between the Voice of Democracy and the Voice of Totalitarianism, every human being in the world has an equal stake. There are those who promote Fascism and Communism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and those on both sides who are devoted to freedom and liberty. Every individual in the world has a choice to make. Liberty is challenged today on a scale never approached in modern times. This struggle of ideas will not go away and leave Iran alone, nor will it bypass any other nook and cranny of the globe where there are human beings, motivated by human desires and aspirations. There can be no neutrals in such a struggle, whether the contest is within a single village, a nation, or the world.

The Voice of America is and must remain a part of the Voice of Democracy. We must strive, in every possible way, to sustain what our experience, and world experience, has shown to be the best system of government and of society yet devised—the system which protects the individual against the repression of his human liberties by the state.

It is wicked for individuals or groups inside the United States or any other democratic country to utilize the freedoms of democracy in order to agitate for a system of government which offers spurious panaceas of equality, but which would immediately eliminate all such freedoms as soon as it came to power. How shallow it is for certain American citizens to visit the Soviet Union and return to this country puffed up with the fact

that they were received on a basis of racial or social equality in the U.S.S.R. I saw the same thing happen to tribesmen in the Middle East.

It is true that Uzbeks and Tajiks and Tartars have the same rights in Moscow as the Russians and Ukrainians and Georgians—the equal privilege of voting and speaking exactly as they are told and of going to Siberia if they breathe a word of criticism of the regime. It is true that democracies have not yet achieved all the equalities to which they aspire, but their vision is not clouded by any false belief that the security of the prison or the equality of the animal is the answer.

The U.S. information program must make these and other facts clear. At the same time, we must guard constantly, in our fight against the Communist brand of totalitarianism, which is most dangerously active at the moment, against the tendency to get in bed with the Fascist type. We must "play it straight down the middle", devoting every ounce of our energies to the preservation of the human personality and the steady advancement towards the achievement of our goals through democratic processes.

Hungarian Campaign Against Voice of America

Statement by Assistant Secretary Allen

[Released to the press July 9]

The Department has been advised that the present authorities in Hungary are carrying forward what appears to be a systematic campaign to frighten the people of Hungary from listening to the news broadcasts and commentaries on the Voice of America.

These measures are not yet in the form of legal or police restrictions against listening to American broadcasts but take the form of arrests of persons on charges of "inciting against Hungarian democracy". The police cite, as one of the evidences of guilt, the fact that the persons arrested have listened to Voice of America broadcasts.

The news broadcasts which we beam to Hungary are factual, objective reports such as the American public reads and listens to daily in American newspapers and radio news broadcasts. The fact that such drastic steps are being taken in Hungary to prevent the people from obtaining news of the outside world is a good indication that our Voice of America broadcasts are proving effective in that country.

More importantly, however, these repressive tactics by the present Hungarian Government to protect its dictatorship by keeping the people in ignorance and insulating them from the outside world is another indication that totalitarian rule is being applied there against the popular will. Its leaders have thus plainly shown that they fear

they can hold their power only by denying to their people, in increasing degree, freedom of information. This device has long been a necessary tool of dictators—Communist and Fascist.

U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange Appointed

[Released to the press by the White House July 9]

The President on July 9 appointed the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange as provided in the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948.¹

The five Commission members were selected to represent the public interest from a cross section of educational, cultural, scientific, technical, and public-service backgrounds as provided in the act. The newly appointed members are:

Harold Willis Dodds, president of Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.

Karl Taylor Compton, president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Bennett Harvie Branscomb, chancellor of Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.

Mark Starr, educational director, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, New York, N.Y.

Martin P. McGuire, professor of Greek and Latin, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

The Advisory Commission is charged under the Mundt-Smith act with formulating and recommending to the Secretary of State policies and programs for carrying out educational-exchange activities under the new law, with the exception of matters provided for in the Fulbright act and those within the jurisdiction of the United States National Commission for UNESCO.

In making the appointments, the President designated Chancellor Branscomb as chairman of the Commission, to serve a three-year term, and specified two-year terms for President Dodds and President Compton and one-year terms for Mr. Starr and Dr. McGuire.

The Commission will meet at least once a month during the first six months of its existence and thereafter at intervals as it finds advisable. It will make quarterly reports to the Secretary of State and semiannual reports to the Congress.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Consular Offices

The American Consulate at Grenada, British West Indies, was officially closed to the public on June 30, 1948. The former Grenada consular district has been assigned to the American Consulate General at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, B.W.I.

¹ Public Law 402, 80th Cong., 2d sess.

Contents

The United Nations and Specialized Agencies

	Page
U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography . .	78
Reaffirming the Policy of the United States in the United Nations:	
Text of Senate Resolution 239 of June 11 . .	79
Conclusions	79
U.S., U.K., France, Canada, and Benelux Countries Discuss Senate Resolution 239	80
Signing of Resolution Providing for U.S. Membership in W.H.O. Statement by the President	80
The United States in the United Nations . . .	81
Report on Sixth Meeting of Preparatory Commission for I.A.O. Article by George L. Warren	83
U.S. Delegation to North Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting of I.C.A.O	84
Treaty Information	
Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey During World War II. Article by Harry N. Howard	63

Occupation Matters

	Page
U.S. Protests Soviet Blockade of Berlin. Note From Secretary Marshall to Ambassador Panyushkin	85
Reply to Polish Protest Concerning Six-Power Talks on Germany. Note From Under Secretary Lovett to Ambassador Winiewicz	86

International Information and Cultural Affairs

U.S. Information Program. Address by George V. Allen	88
Hungarian Campaign Against Voice of America. Statement by Assistant Secretary Allen .	91
U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange Appointed	91

General Policy

Letters of Credence: Czechoslovakia, Panama .	87
---	----

The Foreign Service

Consular Offices	91
----------------------------	----

Contributors

Harry N. Howard, author of the article on the problem of Turkey and the Straits during World War II, is Special Assistant in the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State.